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Members of the Press Detained and Targeted with 
Use of Force by Police, Despite Court Order
T
he trial of former Minneapolis Police Department 
(MPD) officer Derek Chauvin, charged with second-
degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-
degree manslaughter after he pressed his knee into 
the neck of George Floyd, a 46-year-old Black man, 
who died at the scene in May 2020, began on March 29, 2021. It 
continued through mid-April. Meanwhile, on April 11, 2021, a 
Brooklyn Center, Minn. police officer, Kimberly Potter, shot and 
killed Daunte Wright, a 20-year-old Black man, during a traffic 
stop. Potter claimed to have accidentally grabbed and used her 
gun rather than a taser. In the course of these events, protests 
arose once more in the Twin Cities. Although the initial protests 
were generally peaceful, a significant law enforcement response 
followed when tensions escalated. Journalists, photographers, 
and other members of the press covering the protests faced 
arrest, use of force, and threats by law enforcement. Law 
enforcement also issued broad dispersal orders, requiring 
members of the public and press alike to leave an area, ostensibly 
in the interest of public safety.
In response, on April 14, 2021, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) of Minnesota filed a motion in U.S. District Court 
for the District of Minnesota on behalf of a number of journalists, 
photographers, and other members of the news media seeking a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) to prohibit arrests, attacks, 
and threats by police during protests and demonstrations. 
The defendants included the City of Minneapolis; Minnesota 
Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington, 
in his individual and official capacity; Minnesota State Patrol 
Colonel Matthew Langer, in his individual and official capacity; 
and their agents, servants, employees, and representatives.
On April 16, 2021, District of Minnesota Judge Wilhelmina M. 
Wright issued the TRO, which prevented the law enforcement 
defendants from “arresting, threatening to arrest, or using 
physical force — including through use of flash bang grenades, 
non-lethal projectiles, riot batons, or any other means — directed 
against any person whom they know or reasonably should know 
is a Journalist . . ., unless [law enforcement has] probable cause 
to believe that such individual has committed a crime.” The 
order also expressly exempted journalists from dispersal orders, 
including during curfews from which members of the press were 
already exempt.
Wright weighed the press’ ability to gather news and inform 
the public against law enforcement interests in general dispersal 
orders. First, Wright concluded that the plaintiffs “were engaged 
in constitutionally protected news-gathering activities,” citing 
the finding in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) that 
“without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of 
the press could be eviscerated.” She also cited American Civil 
Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 
2012), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that the First Amendment “goes beyond protection of the 
press and self-expression of individuals to prohibit government 
from limiting the stock of information from which members of 
the public may draw.”
Second, Wright rejected the defendants’ argument that “the 
press had no right to ‘remain in an active dispersal area’” and that 
such orders “render[] the press’s news-gathering activities no 
longer a ‘protected activity[.]’” She reasoned that because most of 
the events transpired in public, the news gathering generally took 
place on public streets and sidewalks, to which the press had a 
qualified right of access. Wright further found that the dispersal 
orders were not “narrowly tailored” because the curfews put 
in place in Brooklyn Center exempted the press. She added 
that “preliminary injunctions issued by other courts in similar 
circumstances have required members of the press to adequately 
identify themselves, refrain from impeding law enforcement 
activities, and comply with all laws other than general dispersal 
orders; and those injunctions have maintained law enforcement 
officers’ authority to . . . ‘arrest or otherwise engage with persons 
who commit unlawful acts,’” citing Index Newspapers LLC v. 
U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 834 (9th Cir. 2020).
Third, Wright found that the law enforcement dispersal 
orders create a chilling effect on news gathering. She further 
concluded that there was “a documented pattern of hostility 
by the State Defendants to members of the press” during racial 
justice protests dating back to May 2020, and that the defendants 
“were motivated, at least in part, by the press’s First Amendment 
activities.”
Finally, Wright concluded that the plaintiffs raised “a 
legitimate constitutional question,” and that the public interest 
weighs in favor of the press informing the public about 
newsworthy events over police dispersal orders, therefore 
favoring First Amendment principles. She accordingly granted 
the plaintiffs’ request for a TRO. The full order is available online 
at: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20618077/tro-
minnesota-journalists-at-protests-goyette.pdf. 
Despite the TRO, law enforcement continued to target 
members of the press, intentionally or not. On the night of April 
16/17, 2021, several members of the news media were detained 
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by law enforcement, who forced them to submit to photographs 
being taken of themselves and their credentials. Members of the 
press also faced the use of chemical agents and use of force by 
police. According to the U.S. Press Freedom Tracker, a database 
of press freedom violations in the United States and around the 
world managed by the Freedom of the Press Foundation, on 
April 17, there were at least seven assaults and three arrests/
detainments of journalists. Previously, at least two confrontations 
between members of the press and law enforcement took place 
on April 13 during racial justice demonstrations in Brooklyn 
Center.
In an April 17 interview with USA Today, Adam Hansen, an 
attorney with Apollo Law LLC who is working on the civil case 
with ACLU-Minnesota, said law enforcement’s actions directly 
violated the TRO. “The emergency order 
requires law enforcement to take certain 
steps to protect journalists . . . the order 
requires law enforcement to leave them 
alone,” Hansen said. “We absolutely see 
what happened last night as a violation of the court’s order 
and we’re doing everything we can to make sure that it doesn’t 
continue tonight and on into the future.”
On the afternoon of April 17, Ballard Spahr attorney Leita 
Walker, along with representatives from the Minneapolis Star 
Tribune, Minnesota Public Radio (MPR), and WCCO, the Twin 
Cities’ CBS affiliate, met with Gov. Tim Walz, his spokesperson 
Teddy Tschann, Department of Corrections Commissioner 
Paul Schnell, Department of Public Safety Commissioner John 
Harrington, and Minnesota State Patrol Chief Matt Langer in an 
off-the-record meeting to discuss the confrontations that took 
place the night before. In an email to Minnesota journalists, 
national media organizations, free press advocates, and others, 
Walker wrote that the officials “deeply regretted the misconduct 
that occurred.” They also “embrace” the TRO, according to 
Walker. However, the officials acknowledged that “they are 
struggling with implementing some of what it orders” and 
having a “unified command” given there are over a dozen law 
enforcement agencies responding to the protests. The officials 
also acknowledged that “taking photographs of journalists was 
a mistake and [that they] will not be doing that going forward.” 
Finally, Walker provided advice in her email that despite the 
TRO, “journalists [sh]ould still . . . follow dispersal orders, for 
their own personal safety, including because not every [law 
enforcement] agency is subject to the TRO.”
In a letter sent via email following the meeting, Walker, on 
behalf of 27 news organizations and press advocacy groups, 
including the Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and 
Law, wrote to the officials to “impress upon [them] the gravity 
of the misconduct and to memorialize our conversation and 
the media’s expectations going forward.” Walker asserted that 
“[t]he First Amendment is clear: journalists have a robust right 
of access to gather and report the news without fear of intrusion 
or interference by law enforcement.” She observed, however, 
that the TRO had been violated repeatedly by law enforcement, 
especially on the night of April 16/17. 
Walker also noted that “the abuses perpetrated by law 
enforcement officers in the Twin Cities over the past several 
nights — and going back to last summer — are alarming and, 
yes, threaten to set [Minnesota] apart” from the rest of the United 
States, even as political and social tension affect all areas of the 
country. Additionally, Walker emphasized that “members of the 
media on the ground in Minnesota take their role in reporting on 
the events unfolding seriously. They understand the challenges 
you face in keeping the peace and they do not want to make your 
job harder. They are professionals who have no interest in ‘being 
a part of the story’ themselves.” She added, “All we ask is that 
law enforcement also act reasonably and in a manner consistent 
with the U.S. Constitution and judicial orders. We look forward 
to working with you over the coming days and months to ensure 
that both law enforcement officers and the press are able to do 
their jobs effectively and that these abuses are not repeated. The 
full letter is available online at: http://www.mnspj.org/wp-content/
uploads/4_17_21-Treatment-of-Journalists-in-Brooklyn-Center.
pdf.
The same afternoon, the ACLU of Minnesota sent a letter to 
Judge Wright “to call . . . attention to unfortunate developments 
that have arisen in this case since the Court issued the [TRO] 
yesterday.” The letter contended that only hours after the TRO 
took effect, “the State Defendants escalated the level of assault 
and harassment of journalists to an intolerable degree.” The 
letter provided examples, each of which is detailed below. It 
also noted that counsel for both the plaintiffs and defendants 
met on the morning of April 17 to discuss the events of the 
night before. The letter expressed concern that despite the 
meeting,“the State Defendants remain fixated on ‘grey area’ and/
or hypothetical cases, whereas Plaintiffs are merely asking the 
State Defendants to comply with this Court’s Order and stop the 
targeted, methodical harassment of members of the press who 
are clearly identifiable through their clothes, credentials and/or 
equipment[.]”
The letter concluded by stating that “Plaintiffs appreciate 
that the Court permitted the State Defendants twenty-four 
hours to provide copies of the Court’s order to all of their 
employees. Plaintiffs grow increasingly concerned, however, 
that the State Defendants do not intend to comply with the 
TRO without further intervention from the Court.” The letter 
added that the defendants could also continue to defend actions 
taken against the press by arguing that the protests create a 
“chaotic environment” and that protesters can pose as members 
of the press. The letter therefore requested the opportunity to 
“advise the Court of our ongoing concerns.” The letter, which 
was signed by Teresa Nelson, the ACLU of Minnesota legal 
director, is available online at: https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/20618245-letter-to-judge-wright-journalists-covering-
minnesota-protests.
In an April 17 statement, the Minnesota State Patrol (MSP) 
said that “[f]ollowing feedback from media, and in light of a 
recent temporary restraining order (TRO) filed in federal court, 
MSP will not photograph journalists or their credentials.” 
However, the statement noted that MSP would continue 
“check[ing] credentials so media will not be detained any longer 
than is necessary.” The statement added, “The MSP has not and 
will not target media for doing the important work of showing 
those who are exercising their first amendment rights to express 
themselves, or those who are engaged in the violent, illegal 
activity law enforcement is trying to prevent.” The full statement 
is available online at: https://safetynet.mn.gov/Pages/msp-
statement-recent-temporary-restraining-order.aspx. 
In an April 18 statement, the the Minnesota Pro Chapter of 
the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the Minnesota 
chapter of the Asian American Journalists Association (AAJA) 
“decr[ied] in the strongest possible terms the violent targeting 
and detention of journalists by law enforcement authorities 
during ongoing protests in Brooklyn Center.” The statement 
continued, “A free press is vital to democracy, and ordering the 
press to leave the area, detaining reporters on their stomachs and 
photographing their faces, credentials and I.D.s is tantamount to 
COVER STORY
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intimidation.” The statement concluded 
by adding, “Let us do our jobs.” The full 




Also on April 18, Gov. Walz was 
interviewed by WCCO Sunday morning 
anchor and reporter Esme Murphy. 
When asked about the treatment of 
journalists by law enforcement, Walz 
said, “Apologies are not enough. It 
just cannot happen. These are volatile 
situations. And that’s not an excuse. It’s an 
understanding that we need to continue 
to get better.. . . Reporters are there to 
hold police accountable. They’re there to 
hold protesters accountable. They’re there 
to make sure this is done in accordance 
with our law. If they are detained, for 
any amount of time and held back, they 
are unable to do their jobs.” Walz added, 
“The assault on media across the world 
and even in our country over the last few 
years is chilling. We cannot function as 
a democracy if they are not there. My 
apologies are sincere, but I will tell you 
what, they will take that apology much 
more seriously if they see actions.” Walz 
provided the example of no longer taking 
photographs of journalists and their press 
credentials, saying that law enforcement 
does not have the right to hold journalists 
in that fashion. He also stated that law 
enforcement should not detain a single 
journalist, especially based on their race.
Walz concluded his thoughts on the 
news media by pledging that “the press 
needs to be there [at protests],” including 
news outlets like Unicorn Riot in addition 
to traditional journalists and media 





Jane E. Kirtley, Silha Professor of 
Media Ethics and Law and director 
of the Silha Center for the Study of 
Media Ethics and Law, also released a 
statement. “Members of the public have 
a First Amendment right to peaceably 
assemble, and the news media have a 
concomitant right to report on those 
peaceful protests. When tensions escalate, 
and law enforcement responds, it is 
essential that law enforcement neither 
impedes nor harasses journalists who 
provide a window on these activities. As 
we have seen during the coverage of the 
Derek Chauvin trial, the public relies on 
the independent news media to facilitate 
oversight and understanding of the 
criminal justice process.”
Below is a running list of the incidents 
between the press and police.
Night of April 16/17, 2021
On April 17, WCCO reported that 
law enforcement detained reporter Reg 
Chapman and WCCO photojournalists. 
The police ordered the journalists to 
lie on the ground as they took pictures 
of them and their credentials. More 
information about this incident from 




Additional information from USA Today is 
available online at: https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2021/04/17/
brooklyn-center-protests-police-round-
up-journalists/7268057002/. A video of 
the incident is available online at: https://
youtu.be/PIRzKemQIc8.
Early in the morning on April 17, 
USA Today senior video producer 
Jasper Colt tweeted that law 
enforcement, “[a]fter dispersing 
protesters in #BrooklynCenterMN 
tonight, . . . surrounded members of 
the media and made us lie flat on our 
stomachs. They then photographed our 
faces, credentials and identification 
before allowing us to leave the 
perimeter.” The full tweet is available 
online at: https://twitter.com/jaspercolt/
status/1383285891104342023.
Minneapolis Star Tribune reporter Liz 
Sawyer similarly tweeted that members 
of the news media were “ushered to 
a checkpoint where state patrol is 
taking pictures of every journalist’s 
credentials and face.” A video depicting 
what took place is available online 
at: https://twitter.com/bylizsawyer/
status/1383260779084861444?s=21.
In a separate tweet, Star Tribune 
video journalist Mark Vancleave posted 
a video depicting Sawyer and fellow 
Star Tribune photographer Susan Du 
“being ‘processed’ by Minnesota State 
Patrol after documenting mass arrest 
tonight in Brooklyn Center.” A video 
of the interaction is available online 
at: https://twitter.com/MDVancleave/
status/1383265657601413125?s=20.
According to the ACLU of Minnesota’s 
letter to Judge Wright, “[d]uring this 
incident, Minnesota State Patrol 
threatened [photojournalist] Chris Tuite 
with arrest multiple times, thrust a can of 
pepper spray in his face, and grabbed him 
with such force that it ripped his clothes.” 
Photojournalist Chris Juhn was similarly 
detained and forced to submit to a press 
credential check and photographs.
Vancleave also tweeted that 
photojournalist Tim Evans “was punched 
in the face by an officer while trying 
to present his press credentials to law 
enforcement.” Vancleave included a 
screenshot of Evans’ recollection of the 
incident, in which he wrote, “The sheriff 
sprayed me directly in the face with mace. 
He tackled me to the ground as I was 
telling him I’m press. When I was on the 
ground, I showed him my badge . . . and 
he punched me in the face, then tore 
off my badge and threw it in the dirt. 
Another officer came over, I told him I 
was press and then he smashed my head 
into the ground.” The full screenshot 
of Evans’ account is available online 
at: https://twitter.com/MDVancleave/
status/1383266492150542346?s=20.
According to an April 17 tweet by 
freelance photographer Alex Kent, Agence 
France-Presse video correspondent 
Eléonore Sens and an unidentified 
member of the press were “maced by 
Minnesota Police after an unlawful 
assembly [was] declared[.]” The full tweet, 
which includes a photo of the incident, 
is available online at: https://twitter.com/
AlexKentTN/status/1383290508181590018/
photo/1.
Night of April 13/14, 2021
On April 16, Adam Gray, chief 
photographer for South West News 
Service, based in the United Kingdom, 
tweeted that he was “rushed whilst 
leaving, cuffed, photographed and put 
in a squad car and charged/citated [sic] 
with failure to obey an order” on April 
13. He added that on the night of April 16, 
“Law enforcement in #BrooklynCenter 
tonight punched, pepper sprayed, 
chased, detained and photographed 
media as they Bull rushed protestors.” 
Gray’s series of tweets is available 
online at: https://twitter.com/agrayphoto/
status/1383275095175561221?s=20.
On April 13, Star Tribune reporter 
Andy Mannix tweeted that law 
enforcement “was firing a lot of 
projectiles” as demonstrations were 
approaching their end for the night. 
Mannix stated that one less-lethal 
munition “bounced off the bottom of 
[his] boot as [he] was walking away.” 
Mannix’s full tweet is available online 
at: https://twitter.com/AndrewMannix/
status/1382159998457896960.
According to attorney Leita Walker 
in her email to Gov. Tim Walz and other 
Minnesota officials, CNN producer 
Carolyn Sung was “thrown to the ground 
and arrested by state troopers . . . while 
trying to comply with a dispersal order.” 
One trooper reportedly yelled at Sung, 
whose primary language is English, “Do 
you speak English?” Despite repeatedly 
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explaining that she was a member of 
the news media, Sung was “placed in a 
prisoner-transport bus and sent to the 
Hennepin County Jail, where she was 
patted down and searched by a female 
officer who put her hands down Sung’s 
pants and in her bra, fingerprinted, 
electronically body-scanned, and ordered 
to strip and put on an orange uniform.”
In a series of tweets on April 17, 
Star Tribune reporter Ryan Faircloth 
described how law enforcement 
surrounded a vehicle in which New York 
Times photojournalist Joshua Rashaad 
McFadden, a Black man, was a passenger. 
Faircloth quoted McFadden, who said, 
“They’re hitting me, they’re hitting my 
camera as if they’re trying to break my 
camera lens . . . telling me to get out, but 
I clearly couldn’t get out because now 
they’re blocking the doors.” According to 
Faircloth, only after “a white journalist 
[told] the officers that McFadden was 
indeed a journalist for them to let him 
go.” McFadden added, “I am assuming 
because I am a Black photographer 
that they would not believe me or look 
at my press credential until who I was 
with said, ‘Oh, he’s with the Times.’” 
Faircloth’s thread is available online 
at: https://twitter.com/RyanFaircloth/
status/1383578935301087238.
Night of April 12/13, 2021
Star Tribune video journalist Mark 
Vancleave tweeted on April 17 that on 
the night of April 12/13, he was shot 
in the hand by a rubber bullet fired 
by law enforcement. According to 
Vancleave, “[t]he impact broke [his] 
ring finger in two places requiring 
surgery.” He added, “I won’t be able to 
pick up my camera again for at least 
six weeks.” A photo of the injury and a 
video of the incident is available online 
at: https://twitter.com/MDVancleave/
status/1383514640001363974?s=20.
A Message from the Director
Jane E. Kirtley, Director
Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and Law
— SCott MeMMel
PoStDoCtoral aSSoCiate
On April 18, 2021, the Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and Law published on its website the preceding 
special report on the media law issues arising from the actions taken by law enforcement against members of 
the press at recent racial justice protests. The demonstrations surrounded the trial of former Minneapolis Police 
Department (MPD) officer Derek Chauvin and the April 11, 2021 police killing of Daunte Wright, a 20-year-old Black 
man, during a traffic stop in Brooklyn Center, Minn. Journalists, photographers, and other members of the press 
covering the protests faced arrest, use of force, and threats by law enforcement despite a federal court order limiting 
such actions. Given the importance of the events and court order, we are republishing the report as the cover story of 
this issue of the Silha Bulletin.
Regular readers of the Silha Bulletin will recognize that the Winter/Spring 2021 issue is a departure from our usual format. Instead of providing you with a roundup of significant legal and media ethics developments of the past five months, we have chosen a different approach.  
This issue does two things.  First, we are republishing Postdoctoral Associate (and long-time Bulletin editor) Scott Memmel’s 
comprehensive documentation of the threats to the press and to free speech that arose during the racial justice protests following 
the death of Daunte Wright in Brooklyn Center, Minn. on April 11, 2021. 
Second, we are showcasing some of the scholarly work of our 2020-21 Silha Center Research Assistants. They are pursuing – or 
in Scott’s case, already received – the PhD degree here at the Hubbard School of Journalism and Mass Communication. All three of 
their papers address topics of special interest to them, and that we believe will also be valuable to our readership. This format allows 
them to develop their topics in more detail than would be possible in our typical Bulletin format.
Postdoctoral Associate Scott Memmel’s paper, Targeting News While Targeted By Police: How the Lack of First Amendment 
Protection for Newsgathering Allows Greater Law Enforcement Intrusion and Interference, focuses on an extremely timely issue 
and is an outgrowth of his prize-winning dissertation which he successfully defended in 2020. Scott’s dissertation will soon be a book 
published by the University of Missouri Press.
Research Assistant Sarah Wiley, who passed her PhD “prelims” earlier this year and is now officially a PhD candidate, has a 
strong scholarly interest in technological issues affecting the media, particularly AI (Artificial Intelligence). Her paper, Content 
Moderation and Constitutional Hurdles: First Amendment Limitations on Platform Regulation, is an overview of one of the most 
hotly-debated topics of the past year: whether and how to regulate content on social media platforms. Sarah has just concluded her 
final appointment to the Silha Center, and we wish her well as she moves forward with the writing of her doctoral dissertation.
Finally, PhD student and current Silha Bulletin editor Jonathan Anderson has been studying state open records laws and 
their impact on the public’s right to know since before he came to the University of Minnesota in 2018. In his paper, Challenging 
Government Secrecy: An Analysis of Minnesota Government Data Practices Act Cases in Administrative Court, he examines a 
Minnesota peculiarity: an option for frustrated requesters to seek expedited review of an agency’s denial by filing a complaint with 
the state’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), rather than through a conventional lawsuit.
I am truly delighted to share the outstanding work of our Silha research staff with you. They – and I – would love to hear what 
you think about it.
In her letter to Minnesota officials, 
including Gov. Tim Walz, attorney Leita 
Walker noted that “[t]wo separate 
photojournalists on assignment for 
The New York Times were harassed by 
officers.” In one case, “a Minneapolis 
State Patrol Captain recognized the 
photojournalist, rushed out of a police 
line, and grabbed him. The officer then 
pulled the journalist behind the police 
line where another officer held his hands 
behind his back and took his phone. 
When the journalist asked ‘why,’ the 
officer said: ‘Because that’s our strategy 
right now.’” In the other case, a police 
officer “used a chemical irritant against 
a protestor next to the journalist” before 
“lung[ing] forward and aimed the irritant 




n June 30, 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 
New York Times v. United States — the landmark 
case known as the “Pentagon Papers” — that 
prior restraints upon the press are almost always 
unconstitutional, setting an almost insurmountable 
standard under the First Amendment.1 In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Hugo Black provided one of the most powerful defenses 
of freedom of the press in the history of the Court. He wrote that 
the First Amendment was drafted to “abolish” the government’s 
“power to censor the press . . . so that the press would remain 
forever free to censure the Government [and] . . . inform the 
people.”2 
The opinion would be his last and, in many ways, would 
mark the end of an era in which the Supreme Court “laid the 
foundations of modern press freedom.”3 After serving on the 
court for nearly 35 years, Justice Black, who was known for 
his First Amendment absolutism, resigned in September 1971. 
Within one week, he suffered a stroke and died a few days later.4 
After several nominees turned him down, President Richard 
Nixon appointed Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. to take Black’s seat. 
On June 29, 1972, just one day shy of exactly a year following 
New York Times v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled 
against the press in Branzburg v. Hayes (1972), holding that 
the press does not have a First Amendment privilege to avoid 
grand jury subpoenas seeking disclosure of confidential sources 
and information obtained through eye-witness observations. 
Notably, the 5-4 ruling by the Court hinged on an ambiguous 
concurrence by Justice Powell. 
In ensuing cases, the Supreme Court cited Branzburg in 
denying the press special privileges in other contexts, including 
newsroom searches and seizures, media liability under laws of 
general applicability, and access to government-held information 
and locations such as crime scenes. A related line of federal and 
state court precedent went a step further and established that 
the press cannot interfere with police activities, favoring law 
enforcement interests over those of the press and public.
This article does not argue that Justice Black’s resignation 
and death alone led to these lines of court precedent. However, 
the outcomes in Branzburg and the cases that followed could 
have been different with him on the high court. Timing is 
everything, and the consequences and negative effects stemming 
from this moment in 1971 and 1972 endure into the year 2021, 
which marks the 50th anniversary of New York Times v. United 
States. Without any action to recognize greater protection 
for newsgathering, especially when balanced against law 
enforcement interests, these negative effects will continue.
This article first details how newsgathering is a crucially 
important practice allowing the press to serve its important role 
in the United States, citing First Amendment theory and existing 
scholarship to demonstrate how and why this is the case. 
However, this article also cites previous scholarship focusing on 
two important areas of free press jurisprudence: (1) the blurring 
1 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
2 Id. at 717 (Black, J. concurring).
3 David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 texaS l. rev. 429, 506 
(2002). Anderson added that the Supreme Court “usually found those rights 
in the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press.”
4 Richard L. Pacelle Jr., Hugo Black, firSt aMenDMent enCyCloPeDia (2009), 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1310/hugo-black.
of the Speech and Press Clauses under the First Amendment 
and (2) the lack of constitutional protections for newsgathering.
Second, this article provides background on the high court’s 
rulings in New York Times v. United States and Branzburg, 
walking through how these opinions took significantly different 
tracks in interpreting the First Amendment protections for 
freedom of the press. Although there are other potential 
explanations, Justice Black’s departure from the Supreme 
Court provides a key reason for the differences in the course of 
just one year. In discussing this shift, this article demonstrates 
how Branzburg set the stage for the Supreme Court and lower 
courts to deny newsgathering protections under the First 
Amendment in the rulings that followed. 
Third, this article details the line of court precedent 
following Branzburg in which the Court declined to grant the 
press special privileges not available to members of the public. 
This article also identifies a line of federal and state court 
precedent that favors law enforcement interests over those of 
the press. It argues that courts have not only failed to protect 
newsgathering under the First Amendment, but have also 
weighed it less favorably against law enforcement interests, 
allowing for greater government intrusion into the press’ 
purposes and functions.
Fourth, this article applies these conclusions to current 
events. It outlines the consequences and negative effects of 
these lines of court precedent, focusing on significant instances 
of journalists facing arrest, use of force, and threats by police 
while reporting on racial justice protests across the United 
States. Some members of the press have even faced prosecution 
for allegedly interfering with police activities, raising further 
problems and concerns. Taken together, the negative effects 
undermine newsgathering, source relationships, and journalists’ 
physical safety, as well as chilling newsgathering in both the 
immediate and long-term.
Finally, this article argues that the negative effects arising 
from inadequate protections for newsgathering will only 
continue unless the courts recognize a First Amendment right 
for the press to gather news without government interference, 
especially in cases involving major societal events and issues 
of public concern. These include racial justice protests, where 
it is vital that the press be able to cover underrepresented 
communities’ messages and report them to other members of 
the public. Additionally, it is essential that the press be able to 
report on police response to demonstrations to help to hold 
law enforcement accountable. This article therefore proposes 
a series of recommendations, including calling for judicial and 
legislative actions allowing for special privileges for the press 
specifically in relation to newsgathering. This article also calls 
for increased training of public officials and members of law 
enforcement, as well as improved communication between the 
press and police, to ensure understanding of the importance 
of newsgathering and the harms caused by arrests, use of 
force, and prosecutions of journalists for doing their jobs. 
Significantly, these harms not only affect the press and police, 
but also members of the public who rely on both institutions to 
best serve them.
Targeting News While Targeted By Police: How the Lack 
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I. First Amendment Theory and Existing Scholarship
In 2008, Michael Schudson articulated seven “functions” 
of U.S. journalism: (1) informing the public about political, 
economic, and social information and developments; (2) holding 
government accountable; (3) promoting public involvement in 
democracy; (4) creating change in society; (5) serve as a public 
forum for public discussions and debates; (6) providing analysis 
of complicated information and events; and (7) contributing to 
“social empathy.”5 Each of these functions relies on the media’s 
ability not only to publish or broadcast information, but to 
gather it in the first place, through interviews, records requests, 
news conferences, accessing scenes of noteworthy events, 
and more. Thus, newsgathering lies at the heart of the press’ 
purposes and functions in the United States, each of which is 
meant to benefit the public.
The necessity of newsgathering is reflected in First 
Amendment theory. For example, John H. Garvey and Frederick 
Schauer argued that the “earliest basis for the defense 
of . . . freedom of the press . . . [and] likely also the most 
enduring . . . is free speech as the instrument of the search for 
truth.”6 This concept can be applied to the press, which is meant 
to inform members of the public and foster public debate. 
Here, the word “search” necessarily implies seeking out, and 
hopefully obtaining, information, records, and data.7 
Similarly, in 1977, Vincent Blasi referred to the press’ 
watchdog role as the “checking value” of the press. Blasi 
contended that “a primary purpose of the freedoms of speech 
and press, then and now, [is] to check government as a way of 
preventing abuses.”8 To accomplish this, the press must be free 
from government intrusion into its independent functions. This 
will enable the press to monitor government conduct and help 
assure accountability. This will enable the press to monitor 
government conduct and help assure accountability, which 
necessarily includes the ability of journalists to investigate 
government bodies and officials.
In 1975, the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review noted that several political theorists in the early years of 
the United States “provide some support for the existence and 
necessity of a press right to gather information.”9 For example, 
they cited James Madison, who wrote that information and the 
means for acquiring it are essential to a popular democratic 
government. Tunis Wortman, a Jeffersonian political theorist, 
wrote in 1800 that “The liberty of investigation is equally 
[indispensable] to the judicious exercise of the elective right.”10 
The editors therefore concluded that “[d]espite the scarcity of 
evidence, it is apparent that a press right to gather information 
is compatible with the concept of freedom of the press 
understood by many politicians and political theorists of the 
early American Republic.”11
Legal scholarship has long examined the relationship 
between the First Amendment Speech and Press Clauses.12 For 
5 Michael Schudson, Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press, 13-17 
(2008).
6 John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment: A Reader, 
eds., 57-58 (2002).
7 See Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the Right to Know, 75 
harv. l. rev. 1199, 1204 (1962).
8 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 
aMeriCan Bar founD. reSearCh J. 521 (1977). 
9 Editors, The Right of the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg 
and Pell, 124 u. Pa. l. rev. 166, 170 (1975).
10 Id. (citing Tunis Wortman, A Treatise Concerning Political Enquiry, 
and the Liberty of The Press (1800)).
11 Id. at 171.
12 U.S. Const. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
example, the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review found that a “striking characteristic of Supreme Court 
opinions in this area is that one freedom is seldom distinguished 
from the other.”13 In 2002, David A. Anderson concluded that 
“[t]he constitutional protections that are most important to 
press freedom derive from the Speech Clause and apply to all 
speakers. The few that have been found in the Press Clause, and 
therefore specially favor the press, might better be reconceived 
as speech rights available to all.”14 Citing Branzburg and other 
notable cases, Anderson argued that the 1970s marked the 
beginning of the Supreme Court “avoid[ing] reliance on the 
Press Clause, save for the rare exceptions noted above, and the 
ringing rhetoric has often given way to skepticism about the 
claims of the media.”15 
Some scholars fear that the Press Clause has lost its value. 
Citing Chief Justice John Marshall’s conclusion that “[i]t cannot 
be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to 
be without effect,”16 Sonja R. West nevertheless contended that 
“the Press Clause seems to have become just that — if not ‘mere 
surplusage,’ then little more than an extension of the Speech 
Clause, an afterthought, a side dish to the main constitutional 
entree.”17 She argued that several potential harms arise from 
allowing the Press Clause to “lie dormant,” positing that there is 
a “category of cases where it might not make sense to recognize 
a particular First Amendment right for all speakers, yet where 
our failure to recognize the right for the press harms our 
collective interest in a well-informed populace and a monitored 
government.”18
In 2000, First Amendment scholar Erwin Chemerinsky 
concluded that the legal landscape “provides no constitutional 
protection for newsgathering.”19 He added, “The Supreme 
Court’s low esteem for the press, which is shared by judges at 
all levels, is reflected in constitutional doctrine.”20 The result, 
according to Chemerinsky, is the increased ability to “hold[] the 
media liable for . . . undercover reporting.”21
The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
began combining these two areas of study in 1975 by arguing 
that
Th[e] view of freedom of the press as a 
particularized version of free speech omits an 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”
13 Id. at 173 (citing Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 
ColuM. l. rev. 838, 840-43 (1971); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the 
Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech? 26 haStingS 
l. J. 639 (1975)).
14 Anderson, supra note 3, at 528.
15 Id. at 506.
16 Sonja R. West, The Majoritarian Press Clause, u. of ChiCago legal 
foruM: vol. 2020, available at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1672&context=uclf (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)).
17 Id. at 321–22 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174; First Nat’l Bank 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (describing 
the press freedom as “complementary to and a natural extension of Speech 
Clause liberty”)). 
18 Id. at 322. See also Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 
UCLA L. Rev. 1025 (2011); RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja West, The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Characterizations of the Press: An Empirical 
Study, univerSity of georgia SChool of law legal StuDieS reSearCh PaPer 
forthCoMing, univerSity of utah College of law reSearCh PaPer no. 419 
(2021).
19 Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard 
for Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 u. riCh. l. rev. 1142, 1145 
(2000).
20 Id. at 1142.
21 Id. at 1143.
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information-gathering element.. . . However, there 
may be other rights peculiar to the functions of the 
press, not derivable from the free speech clause, which 
should be recognized. If so, the exercise of these rights 
should rest exclusively in the press, while rights of free 
speech, whatever the mode of communication, rest in 
the public.22
This article seeks to build on this work and further combine 
these two areas of scholarship. To begin doing so, the following 
section discusses a major shift in press freedom jurisprudence 
between 1971 and 1972, then considers court precedent at the 
federal and state levels, as well as negative effects arising from 
this change. This article will apply these conclusions to current 
events, specifically arrests, use of force, and prosecutions of 
journalists arising from their reporting on racial justice protests 
and demonstrations in 2020 and 2021.
II. New York Times v. United States (1971) versus 
Branzburg v. Hayes (1972)
In the course of 364 days, the Supreme Court ruled in New 
York Times v. United States (1971) and Branzburg v. Hayes 
(1972), both cases implicating freedom of the press. However, a 
major shift occurred between the decisions. In New York Times 
v. United States, popularly known as the Pentagon Papers case, 
the Court ruled in favor of the press. In Branzburg, the Court 
narrowly ruled against the press. 
In Pentagon Papers, the Supreme Court focused on whether 
The New York Times and The Washington Post could publish a 
classified U.S. Department of Defense study detailing the history 
of U.S. activities in Vietnam. Military analyst Daniel Ellsberg 
had leaked the documents referred to as the Pentagon Papers.23 
After The New York Times published an initial news report 
based on the study, President Richard Nixon’s administration 
attempted to stop further publication, arguing to two separate 
federal circuit courts that a prior restraint was necessary to 
protect national security.
The Court ruled in a per curiam opinion that the Nixon 
administration had not overcome the “heavy presumption” 
against prior restraints.24 In Near v. Minnesota (1931), the 
Court had previously held that the press’ “constitutional 
right” to publish protected it from government imposition of 
prior restraints, except in very limited circumstances.25 Taken 
together, those two cases established a strong presumption 
that prior restraints are unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.
In a concurring opinion in Pentagon Papers, Justice Black 
provided a robust repudiation of prior restraints on the press by 
the government. He wrote, 
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave 
the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its 
essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve 
the governed, not the governors. The Government’s 
power to censor the press was abolished so that 
the press would remain forever free to censure the 
government. The press was protected so that it could 
bare the secrets of government and inform the people. 
22 Editors, supra note 9, at 174 (citing 1 annalS of Cong. 452 (1789) 
(remarks of James Madison)).
23 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
24 Id. at 714.
25 Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 714–16 (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 
U.S. 454, 462 (1907); Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319 (1788)).
Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively 
expose deception in government.26
Justice Black emphasized the importance of the press’ 
functions, as well as its central role in U.S. democracy and 
society. Additionally, Justice Black also emphasized the need 
for the press to be independent from the government in order to 
inform and serve the American public. This concurring opinion 
would prove to be Justice Black’s final opinion on the Supreme 
Court. Less than five months later, he resigned from the Court, 
and died shortly thereafter. Justice Powell then took Black’s 
seat on the Court beginning in January 1972.
Almost exactly one year after the Supreme Court decided 
New York Times v. United States, Branzburg focused on the 
issue of a reporter’s privilege against compelled disclosure 
of confidential sources and information.27 Paul Branzburg, 
a writer for The Louisville Courier-Journal, published two 
stories concerning illicit drug use and manufacture in Kentucky. 
His sources asked not to be identified.28 In a similar case, 
Earl Caldwell, a reporter for The New York Times, was given 
extraordinary access to covert Black Panther meetings, during 
which he interviewed several members.29 In a third case, Paul 
Pappas, a television reporter based in Massachusetts, also 
reported on the Black Panthers after spending several hours at 
their headquarters.30 All three journalists were subpoenaed to 
testify before separate grand juries about illegal activities they 
might have witnessed. They refused to do so and were found in 
contempt.31 The question for the Supreme Court was whether 
journalists should be held to the same standard as members 
of the public regarding subpoenas and grand jury testimony, 
including disclosure of confidential source information.32
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Byron White, sided 
against the press. White held that because members of the 
general public are not constitutionally immune from testifying 
before a grand jury under a subpoena, this same standard 
should be applied to members of the press.33 This narrow ruling 
declined to recognize a special privilege for the press under the 
First Amendment.34 Such a special privilege would have most 
directly implicated journalists’ source relationships and work 
materials, critical components of newsgathering.
However, the Court did conclude that “news gathering is 
not without its First Amendment protections,”35 adding, “Nor 
is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First 
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking 
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”36 
However, as subsequent jurisprudence demonstrates, any claim 
of a First Amendment right for newsgathering is generally 
“empty rhetoric.” 37
Significantly, Justice Powell filed an ambiguous concurrence: 
[T]he asserted claim to privilege should be judged 
on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between 
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens 
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal 
26 Id. at 717 (Black, J. concurring).
27 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See also Scott Memmel, 
“Defending the Press: The Shield that Sets Minnesota Apart,” CoMMC’n l. 
rev. 19, no. 1 (2019): 4-5.
28 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668–69.
29 Id. at 675.
30 Id. at 672.
31 Id. at 679.
32 Id. at 697.
33 Id. at 682.
34 Id. at 709.
35 Id. at 707. 
36 Id. at 681.
37 Chemerinsky, supra note 19.
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conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional 
and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords 
with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such 
questions.38
Although joining the plurality under this set of facts, 
Powell seemed inclined to recognize that there might be other 
situations in which journalists could receive special testimonial 
privileges not available to the public. Nevertheless, the holding 
came down as 5-4 against press interests, setting the stage for 
additional Supreme Court rulings to do the same using the 
reasoning in Branzburg.
In less than one year, the Supreme Court issued two very 
different rulings related to the First Amendment and freedom 
of the press. What happened to cause this change? Certainly, 
the two cases were based on entirely different sets of facts and 
focused on different areas of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
But both involve the scope of protections for newsgathering and 
reporting under the First Amendment. In the interim, there was 
a noticeable shift in the composition of the Court. Given Justice 
Black’s absolutist First Amendment views, as demonstrated 
by his concurring opinion in Pentagon Papers, it is likely that 
Branzburg would have come down differently had he still been 
on the Court. This is especially the case given Justice Powell’s 
ambiguous concurrence, which tipped the scales in ruling 
against the press.
III. Court Precedent
The Supreme Court subsequently cited Branzburg 
in declining to extend to the press special privileges not 
available to members of the public. The Court did so in several 
different areas primarily related to newsgathering, including 
1) newsroom searches and seizures; 2) liability under laws of 
general applicability, including invasion of privacy, criminal 
trespass, and wiretapping; 3) access to information; and 
4) access to locations, including prisons, as well as crime, 
emergency, and disaster scenes. Particularly in cases involving 
locational access, a line of precedent developed in which 
federal and state courts favored law enforcement interests over 
those of the press.
A. Newsroom Searches and Seizures
The first area where the Supreme Court declined to 
extend a First Amendment privilege to the press in relation to 
newsroom searches and seizures39 was in Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily (1978).40 Citing Branzburg, specifically Justice Powell’s 
concurrence, the Court did “not support the view that the 
Fourth Amendment contains an implied exception for the press, 
through the operation of the First Amendment.”41 The Court 
added, 
Nor are we convinced, any more than we were in 
Branzburg . . . that confidential sources will disappear 
and that the press will suppress news because of fears 
of warranted searches. Whatever incremental effect 
there may be in this regard if search warrants, as well 
as subpoenas, are permissible in proper circumstances, 
it does not make a constitutional difference in our 
judgment.
Thus, Zurcher marked a key instance in which the Court not 
only declined to extend a special privilege to the press, but used 
38 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J. concurring).
39 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 550 (1978).
40 Id. at 567–68.
41 Id. at n. 3 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J. concurring)).
Branzburg, among other cases and reasoning, as its justification 
for doing so.
B. Laws of General Applicability
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991), the Court ruled that 
“[g]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment 
simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”42 
Here, the Court concluded that the First Amendment did not 
bar the press from being sued under a promissory estoppel 
theory after two newspapers broke an oral contract promising 
confidentiality to Republican campaign associate Dan Cohen. 
Cohen had approached several media outlets with allegations 
that the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party candidate 
for lieutenant governor had been previously convicted of 
shoplifting, on condition that his identity not be revealed. In 
reaching its ruling, the Court cited instances of the press not 
receiving special privileges, including in Branzburg.43
Being subject to laws of general applicability also arises 
in the context of privacy, criminal trespass, and wiretapping. 
A seminal case is the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Dietemann v. 
Time (1971), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the First 
Amendment “is not a license to trespass, steal, or intrude by 
electronic means into home or office.”44 Similarly, in Food Lion, 
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (1999), the Fourth Circuit held 
that reporters who gain access to private facilities under false 
pretenses for newsgathering purposes are not protected by 
the First Amendment and may be liable for claims including 
criminal trespass.45 The court cited Cohen and held that the 
ruling outweighed the Branzburg dicta that “without some 
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could 
be eviscerated.”46 State courts have also ruled against the press 
in some cases where undercover reporting led to claims of 
invasion of privacy 47 and criminal trespass.48
C. Access to Locations and Information; Weighing Press 
vs. Law Enforcement Interests
The Supreme Court and lower courts have also used 
Branzburg to conclude that the press does not have a special 
right of access to a variety of newsworthy locations, including 
prisons and jails, as well as crime, disaster, and emergency 
scenes. Significantly, a related line of federal and state court 
precedent developed that weighs law enforcement interests 
over those of the press.
First, the Court held in a series of cases that the press 
does not have a First Amendment right to access prisons 
and prisoners. In Pell v. Procunier (1974), the Court cited 
Branzburg in holding that “newsmen have no constitutional 
right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that 
afforded the general public.49 The Court also held that the 
First Amendment “does not . . . require government to accord 
the press special access to information,” such as interviews 
with prison inmates.50 The Supreme Court similarly refused to 
42 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
43 Id.
44 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
45 Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). See also 
United States v. Maldonado-Norat, 122 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.P.R. 2000).
46 Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 520 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681).
47 See e.g. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal. 
1998); Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 69 (Cal. 1999).
48 See e.g. Arizona v. Wells, No. LC2003000566001DT, 2004 WL 1925617 
(Ariz. Super. 2004); Stahl v. Oklahoma, 665 P.2d 839, 840 (Okla.App. 1983).
49 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974). See also Saxbe v. Washington 
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
50 Pell, 417 U.S. at 819. 
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provide the press special access to prisons and prisoners in 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. (1974), which the Court found 
that the case was “constitutionally indistinguishable” from 
Pell.51
In Houchins v. KQED (1978), reporters at KQED, a public 
television station, asked to visit the Greystone facility at a 
county jail where maltreatment and suicides had occurred.52 
The sheriff denied access, instead setting up preplanned tours 
for the public and the press on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
The tours would not have passed through the Greystone 
facility.53 The Supreme Court held that the press could not 
demand a right of access to a county jail greater than that of 
members of the public,54 even when a journalist sought to 
“interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and 
photographs for publication and broadcasting by newspapers, 
radio, and television.”55 As part of its reasoning, the Court cited 
Branzburg, holding that it “offer[ed] even less support for the 
respondents’ position” that a special right of access “flows 
logically from our decisions construing the First Amendment.”56 
The Court also noted that the “public’s interest in knowing 
about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free 
Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is 
neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets 
Act.”57
Second, the Court had found in Branzburg that journalists 
“have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime 
or disaster when the general public is excluded.”58 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied this reasoning in 
Chavez v. City of Oakland (2011).”59 
The Tenth Circuit also declined to extend a special right 
of access to locations and information. Mazzetti v. United 
States (1975) arose when newspaper reporter Michael 
Mazzetti was sentenced to fifteen days in jail after being 
found in contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).60 Mazzetti had 
“persistently tak[en] photographs of federal prisoners and 
other photographs in prohibited areas of the federal courthouse 
premises at Leavenworth, Kansas” in violation of Rule 18, 
a local court rule.61 Mazzetti claimed that Rule 18 violated 
the First Amendment and was constitutionally overbroad.62 
However, the Tenth Circuit held that the statute was a 
“reasonable . . . due-process mandate” that preserves a fair trial. 
The court therefore rejected Mazzetti’s claim that “his status 
as a newsman should carry a special first amendment impact,” 
finding that “[t]he suggestion as a generality has been negated 
in [Saxbe].”63 The court added that “most certainly a newsman 
in the circumstances of this case has no special right to foster a 
disturbance or create news himself.”64
Another line of related precedent holds that the press 
cannot interfere with — meaning inhibit, hinder, or otherwise 
obstruct — law enforcement even in the course of activities 
51 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
52 Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (plurality opinion). See also 
Matthew Schafer, Does Houchins Matter (April 16, 2021), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3827906.
53 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 5.
54 Id. at 15.
55 Id. at 3. 
56 Id. at 7, 10. 
57 Id. at 3.
58 Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 at 684–85.
59 Chavez v. City of Oakland, 414 Fed.Appx. 939 (9th Cir. 2011).
60 Mazzetti v. United States, 518 F.2d 781 (10th Cir. 1975).
61 Id. at 782.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 783.
64 Id.
protected by the First Amendment. This rationale can be traced 
back to Branzburg, where the Court held that it could not 
“entertain . . . the theory that it is better to write about crime 
than to do something about it.”65 
New Jersey v. Lashinsky (1979) arose when Star-Ledger 
photographer Harvey I. Lashinsky took several photographs 
at the scene of a serious car accident, thinking it was “a ‘spot 
news event’ worthy of coverage[.]”66 Soon after, New Jersey 
State Police Trooper Eric Herkloz arrived at the scene where 
an addition 40-50 people had also gathered. Herkloz ordered 
everyone to clear the area after he noticed that gas, oil, and 
transmission fluid were leaking from the vehicle.67 He also 
wished to preserve the scene for investigation as the driver 
of the vehicle had been killed and her daughter seriously 
injured.68 Lashinsky initially did not leave the scene. After he 
was individually asked to “please leave the scene,” he stepped 
back only five feet. Despite showing his press card — which 
was issued by the state police — to Herkloz, he was ordered 
one final time to leave. Although Lashinsky claimed that 
Herkloz arrested him immediately, witnesses alleged that the 
arrest came after Lashinsky “engaged the trooper in a heated 
argument . . . during which Lashinsky hurled expletives at 
Herkloz and told the officer to go away and do his own job and 
let Lashinsky do his.” 
The New Jersey Supreme Court first concluded that 
there was “ample evidence from which to conclude that the 
defendant impeded the trooper in the performance of his 
duties.”69 However, the Court also acknowledged that two 
additional photographers, one from the New Jersey Highway 
Authority and one from the state police, arrived, one of whom 
was allowed to stay by Herkloz. The trooper reasoned that the 
photographer was “supposed to be out there to take pictures of 
the accident.. . . It was the man’s job.”70
Second, Lashinsky claimed that he “did not directly, 
physically interfere with the officer’s movement” and “did 
not have the specific intent to interfere with the officer”71 in 
violation of the New Jersey disorderly persons statute, N.J.S.A. 
2A:170-29(2)(b), which “forbids an individual to obstruct, 
molest or interfere with another person who is lawfully in any 
place.”72 The Court held that the statute did not require that the 
prohibited conduct be physical in nature,73 and also ruled that 
the statute did not require specific intent but rather that the 
conduct “be truly obstructive.”74 Additionally, the Court found 
that “the statute [did] not suffer from constitutional overbreadth 
or vagueness.”75
Finally, the Court rejected Lashinsky’s assertion that the 
statute “does not in these circumstances reach him by virtue of 
his status as a member of the press.”76 The Court acknowledged 
that it had “declared that the right of the press to gather news 
is entitled to special constitutional protection” and cited the 
finding in Branzburg that “newsgathering is not without its 
First Amendment protections.”77 The Court also noted that any 
limitations placed on a journalist’s “constitutional prerogatives 
must take into account the unique role of the press in public 
65 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692.
66 New Jersey v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 6 (1979).
67 Id. at 6–7.
68 Id. at 7.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 8.
71 Id. at 8-9.
72 Id. at 9.
73 Id. at 9.
74 Id. at 10-11.
75 Id. at 19.
76 Id. at 13.
77 Id. (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681, 707).
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life.”78 Furthermore, the Court recognized that “[a]n officer 
should, if made aware of the identity and status of an individual 
as a newsperson engaged in gathering news, be mindful that 
such an individual has a legitimate and proper reason to be 
where he is and, if possible, this important interest should be 
accommodated.”79
However, the Court emphasized that “the constitutional 
prerogatives of the press,” including newsgathering, must be 
balanced with “other important and legitimate government 
interests.”80 The Court continued, “The liberty which the press 
seeks to assure our people can be meaningfully enjoyed only 
in a society where there is an adequate measure of order.”81 
The Court also made clear that the First Amendment “does not 
serve to place the media or their representatives above the law,” 
meaning journalists and news organizations “are subject to law, 
as any citizen. The converse proposition would be intolerable.”82
The Court therefore balanced the “competing values” 
between the press and law enforcement to determine the 
“reasonableness” of the restriction of a journalist’s activities83 
and concluded that Herkloz’s order to Lashinsky was 
reasonable “from an objective standpoint and under all of the 
circumstances . . . even taking into account the special role 
performed by the press.”84 Lashinsky’s “obstreperous” actions, 
according to the Court, “impeded the trooper [who,] virtually 
working alone, could not, in his professional judgment, have 
permitted defendant to remain, even as a member of the 
press, and still discharge his own paramount responsibilities 
for the safety and welfare of those who were his immediate 
concern.” Lashinsky was therefore obligated to follow the 
order and his failure to do so “was plainly unlawful[.]” Thus, 
the Court favored the law enforcement interests in this case 
over those of Lashinsky and newsgathering more broadly, 
rejecting First Amendment protection for press access when a 
journalist violates police orders and potentially interferes in law 
enforcement functions.85
However, Justice Morris Pashman took a different view in a 
dissenting opinion, writing that because Lashinsky “was a news 
photographer engaged in the task of reporting a newsworthy 
event,” the order for him to leave was unreasonable.86 Justice 
Pashman first reasoned that Lashinsky, and journalists in 
general, do “not visit the scene of a crime or an accident simply 
for [their] own edification,” but instead “to gather information 
to be passed along to the public at large.”87 Second, Justice 
Pashman acknowledged that press cards do “not purport to 
78 Id. The Court noted that “[r]estrictions which fail to give proper weight 
to the importance of the news and those who gather it and which are not 
necessary to accommodate any other legitimate governmental concerns 
would have no justification.” Id.
79 Id. at 14.
80 Id. at 13.
81 Id. The Court cited the finding in Houchins that “the First Amendment’s 
concern that the public be optimally informed could in some instances 
render unreasonable restraints upon the scope of access to members of 
the press even where it would not be unreasonable to exclude the general 
public.” Id. at 14.
82 Id. at 14.
83 Id. at 14.
84 Id. at 15.
85 Scott Memmel, Pressing the Police and Policing the Press: The 
History and Law of the Relationship Between the News Media and 
Law Enforcement in the United States (2020) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Minnesota), available at https://conservancy.umn.edu/
handle/11299/216360.
86 Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 24 (Pashman, J. dissenting).
87 Id. Justice Pashman added, “It is precisely for this reason that the 
framers of the First Amendment accorded news media representatives a 
special right both to acquire and disseminate the news.” Id.
grant newsmen a [c]arte blanche to wander wherever they 
may choose.”88 However, he found that the “only ‘interference’ 
caused [to] Trooper Herkloz by defendant consisted of 
defendant’s photographing of the scene of the accident.”89 Third, 
Justice Pashman reasoned that Lashinsky, “as a card-carrying 
member of the press” was capable of evaluating the safety risk 
at the accident scene.90 Finally, Justice Pashman concluded 
that the majority’s ruling “in effect allows the police to remove 
any newsman from the scene of any accident merely because 
that newsman is competently performing his job. As such, the 
press’s right of special access is rendered meaningless.”91
Some courts have held that journalists do have a First 
Amendment right to cover news at crime, accident, or 
disaster scenes. For example, in Westinghouse Broadcasting 
Corporation v. National Transportation Safety Board (1982), 
the First Circuit concluded that law enforcement’s limits on 
access to a plane-crash site impinged on “the constitutional 
right of the [press] to obtain news.”92 However, these courts 
make clear that members of the press retain that right 
only so long as they do not interfere with law enforcement 
activities. For example, in Gazette Publishing Co. v. Cox 
(1967), the Southern District of Indiana held that journalists 
“have a constitutional right not to be interfered with” by law 
enforcement so long as they “do not unreasonably obstruct or 
interfere with . . . official investigations of physical evidence 
or gain access to any place from which the general public is 
prohibited for essential safety purposes.”93 
In a more recent line of cases, several federal circuit 
courts have held that the press and public both have a First 
Amendment right to record police officers in the course of 
their duties in public places — provided they do not interfere 
with police activities. The first such ruling was by the Eleventh 
Circuit in 2000, holding that the “First Amendment protects the 
right to gather information about what public officials do on 
public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of 
public interest.”94 
In 2011, the First Circuit held that recording public officials 
engaged in their duties in a public space “is a basic and 
well-established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment.”95 
However, the court also held, significantly, that the First 
Amendment does not apply if the bystander directly interferes 
with law enforcement activity. In 2012, the Seventh Circuit 
enjoined enforcement of an Illinois eavesdropping law because 
it “likely violate[d] the First Amendment” by prohibiting people 
from making audio recordings of the police in public.96 The 
following year, the Ninth Circuit recognized a First Amendment 
right to photograph police,97 citing its ruling in Fordyce v. 
Seattle (1995), which found that “a genuine issue of material 
fact exist[ed] regarding whether [the plaintiff] was assaulted 
88 Id. at 26.
89 Id. Justice Pashman added, “In no other respect did defendant, who was 
15 to 20 feet away from the wreck, “obstruct” Herkloz in the performance 
of his duties. Consequently, Herkloz’s order that defendant leave the site 
was clearly unreasonable.” He also noted that the argument between the 
photographer and trooper came “after and as a direct result of Herkloz’s 
order that defendant move on.” Id. at 27.
90 Id. at 29.
91 Id.
92 Westinghouse Broadcasting Corp. v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 670 F.2d 4 
(1st Cir. 1982).
93 Gazette Publishing Co. v. Cox, Case No. IP 65-C-528 (S.D. Ind. 1967). See 
also Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 468 (D.N.H. 1990).
94 Smith v. Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
95 Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
96 ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
97 Adkins v. Limtiaco, 537 Fed.Appx. 721, 722 (9th Cir. 2013).
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and battered by a Seattle police officer . . . to prevent or 
dissuade him from exercising his First Amendment right to 
film matters of public interest” and gather news.98 In 2017, the 
Fifth Circuit ruled that “the principles underlying the First 
Amendment support the particular right to film the police,” 
although the right is not absolute.99 The same year, the Third 
Circuit also held that bystanders have a First Amendment right 
to record on-duty police officers in public places.100 
Significantly, these cases represent judicial recognition that 
the press and public have a First Amendment right to observe 
and record police, even over their objections, as long as they 
do not interfere with police operations. In an interview with 
the Poynter Institute for Media Studies, media attorney Robb 
Harvey emphasized that journalists cannot interfere with police 
activity because “[e]very state . . . has some statute on the books 
making it a crime to interfere with or obstruct official police 
business.”101 
Furthermore, courts can, and have, favored law enforcement 
interests over those of the press, such as in Lashinsky where 
the Tenth Circuit held that a state trooper had reasonably 
ordered that a photographer leave an accident scene despite 
his performing of constitutionally-protected activities. Another 
example is United States v. Matthews (2000), in which the 
Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment did not provide a 
defense for freelance journalist Larry Matthews, who claimed 
to be investigating the distribution of child pornography 
online when he was arrested and charged by the FBI with 
trafficking such content in violation of the child pornography 
law, Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 22.102 The court affirmed the ruling of U.S. District Court 
for the District of Maryland Judge Alexander Williams, Jr., who, 
in rejecting the argument that Matthews’ online activities were 
protected by the First Amendment, favored the law enforcement 
interest in protecting children from exploitation over the 
press’ newsgathering function.103 Williams cited Branzburg 
as authority, explaining that the Court “examined both the 
expected burden on news gathering and the important role of 
the grand jury in effective law enforcement, and concluded 
that the public’s interest in law enforcement was sufficient 
to override the burden imposed.”104 Williams ultimately held 
that the press’ interest in investigations and newsgathering 
involving online child pornography “is insignificant compared 
to the government’s interest in preventing the exploitation of 
children.”105
Ultimately, existing case law “protect[s] press access 
[to physical locations] from unreasonable restriction.”106 
However, court precedent stemming from Branzburg also 
makes clear that the press does not receive a special right 
of access to locations not accessible to the general public. 
98 Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995). See also 
Askins v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 899 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that the right to record police extends to border agents).
99 Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017).
100 Fields v. Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3rd Cir. 2017).
101 Al Tompkins, What to Do When Police Tell You to Stop Taking Photos, 
Video, Poynter, (June 9, 2010), available at https://www.poynter.org/
reportingediting/2010/what-to-do-when-police-tell-you-to-stop-taking-
photos-video/. 
102 United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 350 (4th Cir. 2000). 
103 United States v. Matthews, 11 F.Supp.2d 656, 661 (D.Md.1998).
104 Id. (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690–91, 695). 
105 Id. at 663.
106 “What Rights Do Journalists Have at Accident or Disaster Scenes?,” 
Freedom Forum Institute, accessed Feb. 19, 2020, https://www.
freedomforuminstitute.org/about/faq/what-rights-do-journalists-have-at-
accident-or-disaster-scenes/.
As a consequence, despite the dicta in Branzburg, the high 
court has declined to extend First Amendment protection 
to newsgathering as a practical matter. Effectively, this line 
of court precedent favors law enforcement interests over 
newsgathering.107
D. Summary
As this overview demonstrates, the press does not receive 
special protections not available to the public under the First 
Amendment. Whatever special privileges they may enjoy are 
found outside of constitutional protections, such as through 
press credentials, statutory and common law protections for the 
reporter’s testimonial privilege, and statutes such as the Privacy 
Protection Act (PPA), which provides journalists with qualified 
protection from searches and seizures by law enforcement 
of unpublished work product and documentary materials.108 
Additionally, at least three states’ laws grant the press a 
qualified right of access to emergency and disaster scenes, 
including California, Ohio, and Alaska.109
There may be a legal remedy if law enforcement arrests a 
journalist for covering the news, rather than for breaking a 
generally-applicable law. Journalists may bring a civil rights 
claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, known as a “§1983 action,” against 
police for interfering with their ability to gather news.110 
However, it can be challenging for journalists to establish that 
police actually interfered with newsgathering as contrasted with 
whether the journalists were interfering with law enforcement 
activities.111 Thus, successful §1983 actions, as well as defenses 
against prosecutions for breaking generally-applicable laws, can 
be an uphill battle in the absence of court precedent specifically 
protecting newsgathering. 
Branzburg was not the first case decided by the Supreme 
Court denying journalists special rights of access to locations 
and information.112 However, it marked a departure from 
the pro-press ruling in New York Times v. United States 
(1971). Additionally, the case and its reasoning were cited in 
subsequent Supreme Court and lower court rulings that also 
declined to recognize special protections for the press, often 
favoring police interests over those of the press. As discussed 
below, this allows for greater intrusion by government and law 
enforcement into press activities and independence, including 
through arrests, use of force, and prosecutions.
107 See Mazzetti, 518 F.2d at 781; Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 1; Connell, 733 
F.Supp. at 466, 470; Fields, 862 F.3d at 360; Turner, 848 F.3d at 678; Glik, 
655 F.3d at 84.
108 Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa et seq. (1980). The 
PPA defines “work product” as materials created “in anticipation of 
communicating such materials to the public,” including conclusions, 
opinions, or theories. “Documentary materials” are those “upon which 
information is recorded,” such as written materials, photographs, and 
electronically recorded tapes or discs. See also The Privacy Protection Act 
of 1980, eleCtroniC Priv. info. Center, accessed June 25, 2019, https://epic.
org/privacy/ppa/.
109 Cal. Penal Code § 409.5(a) (2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.13(B) 
(2004); Alaska Stat. § 26.23.200(2) (2004).
110 See Kelly Weill, ACLU Sues D.C. Police Over Journalist’s 
Inauguration Arrest, Daily BeaSt (June 23, 2017), available at https://www.
thedailybeast.com/aclusues-dc-police-over-journalists-inauguration.
111 Jonathan Peters, Journalists in Ferguson: Know your rights, 
ColuMBia JournaliSM rev., Aug. 21, 2014, https://archives.cjr.org/united_
states_project/press_rights_in_ferguson.php.
112 See e.g. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965); Grosjean v. American 
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 
103 (1937); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 
192–93 (1946); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Citizen 
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969); Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943).
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IV. Negative Effects
The lack of special privileges for the press, coupled with 
courts favoring law enforcement interests over those of the 
news media, have resulted in several negative effects on the 
press’ important purposes and functions tied to gathering 
news. These negative effects have continued through 2021. This 
necessitates action.
First, the lack of special privileges regarding access to 
locations and information limits newsgathering. Put simply, 
the press’ ability to gather news is hindered when journalists 
are restricted as to where they can go and what information 
they can obtain. Certainly, journalists cannot go wherever they 
please, but limiting access is especially problematic when it 
relates to covering matters of public concern, especially when 
access to locations and information would be unlikely to have 
a detrimental effect on police activities. Furthermore, it can 
result in increased reliance on the whim of government officials 
to grant access to locations and information, which raises 
concerns about supposedly independent media promulgating 
the “official version” of events and neglecting the perspective of 
underrepresented communities.113
Second, Branzburg declined to recognize a First 
Amendment-based absolute privilege against disclosure of 
confidential sources and information. Some protections do 
exist, largely under statutory and common law, with only a 
few federal circuit courts recognizing a First Amendment 
reporter’s privilege.114 In any event, the messy legal landscape 
can undermine source relationships because journalists may not 
be protected from compelled disclosure even under statutory 
law. At the very least, this uncertainty may deter journalists 
and/or their sources from making promises of confidentiality, 
meaning fewer people would be willing to talk to the press 
and consequently, that the public will be deprived of valuable 
information.
Third, the lack of special protections for journalists can 
lead to a chilling effect on reporting. In particular, the legal 
landscape allows for police to arrest journalists engaged in 
newsgathering if there is even a modicum of interference in 
police activities. Journalists have also been the target of law 
enforcement threats and use of force, including being tackled to 
the ground or being hit with rubber bullets, pepper balls, or tear 
gas, in the course of newsgathering. Put simply, if journalists 
are detained, in jail, or in the hospital, they cannot report on 
important newsworthy events in the short term. In the long 
term, in the face of these threats to their physical safety and 
wellbeing, journalists may be less willing or able to report from 
future chaotic scenes where police are involved. The chilling 
effect is only exacerbated by the prospect of lengthy and costly 
legal battles to vindicate press rights.
Finally, the lack of special privileges for the press bleeds 
into prosecutions of journalists, especially when charged with 
allegedly interfering with law enforcement. These cases are not 
a “slam dunk” because the absence of privileges for the press 
means the First Amendment is not a “get-out-of-jail free” card 
for anyone.115 Furthermore, even when the press can cite First 
113 See Paul Farhi & Elahe Izadi, Journalists are reexamining 




114 Absolute or qualified privilege, rePorterS CoMMittee for freeDoM of the 
PreSS, accessed Feb. 21, 2020, https://www.rcfp.org/privilege-sections/b-
absolute-or-qualified-privilege/.
115 See generally Michael Kunzelman & Jacques Billeaud, Some Jan. 6 
defendants try to use journalism as riot defense, AP (April 18, 2021), 
available at https:// apnews.com/article/nm-state-wire-government-and-
Amendment protection which the public also enjoys, courts can, 
and have, favored law enforcement interests over those of the 
press. 
It is worth noting that law enforcement also faces potential 
negative consequences from arrests, use of force, and threats 
against members of the press, including risking negatively 
affecting their public image. Police departments, officials, 
and officers also face potential litigation under §1983 actions. 
Significantly, when the press and police are negatively affected, 
so too is the public. When the press and police cannot or do not 
adequately accomplish their important societal roles, they do 
not fully serve and benefit the public as they are meant to do.116
Each of the negative effects on the press and public interest 
arose with arrests, use of force, and prosecutions of journalists 
arising in the aftermath of the May 25, 2020 murder of George 
Floyd, a 46-year-old Black man, while in the custody of 
Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers.117 At the time, 
Floyd’s death was another in a series of police killings of Black 
men and women across the United States, a trend that has only 
continued.118 In the days, weeks, and months following Floyd’s 
death, peaceful and violent protests erupted across the country 
and internationally, sparked by efforts to draw attention to 
important racial justice issues. 
Journalists from around the world covered the protests, 
reporting not only on what transpired during the protests, 
but also the messages of the demonstrators and the Black 
community. By reporting the law enforcement response to 
the protests, journalists were holding the police accountable. 
However, in the course of this reporting, members of the 
press faced arrests, attacks, and threats by law enforcement. 
According to U.S. Press Freedom Tracker, there were over 880 
press freedom incidents amidst racial justice protests between 
May 2020 and January 2021 across at least 79 U.S. cities. They 
included at least 170 physical attacks of journalists by police 
and at least 115 arrests.119
Additionally, at least four journalists faced prosecutions after 
being arrested or detained at the protests around the death of 
Floyd. One such case targeted Des Moines Register reporter 
Andrea Sahouri, who was arrested at a racial justice protest 
following the death of Floyd.120 Des Moines Police officer Luke 
Wilson alleged that he had no choice but to arrest Sahouri when 
she allegedly refused to leave an area after the officer deployed 
politics-journalismriots-70192823f35380b860b6f2708904bc5c.
116 Memmel, supra note 85.
117 For more information on Floyd’s death, the ensuing protests, and 
actions taken against journalists by law enforcement, see Scott Memmel 
& Jonathan Anderson, Special Report: Journalists Face Arrests, Attacks, 
and Threats by Police Amidst Protests Over the Death of George Floyd, 
25 Silha Bull. 3-15 (Winter/Spring 2020); Scott Memmel, Ongoing Protests 
and Confrontations Between the Press and Police Prompt Legal Action, 
Ethical Debates, and Media Advocacy, 26 Silha Bull. 10-17 (Fall 2020).
118 See e.g. Mara Klecker & Kim Hyatt, Brooklyn Center police fatally 
shoot man, 20, inflaming tensions during the Derek Chauvin trial, Star 
triBune (April 12, 2021), https://www.startribune.com/brooklyn-center-
police-fatally-shoot-man-20-inflaming-tensions-during-the-derek-chauvin-
trial/600044821/.
119 Press Freedom in Crisis, u.S. PreSS freeDoM traCker, accessed April 3, 
2021, https://pressfreedomtracker.us/george-floyd-protests/.
120 Kirstin McCudden, Arrested for covering protests, four journalists are 
due in court this month, freeDoM of the PreSS founDation, Feb. 25, 2021, 
https://freedom.press/news/arrested-covering-protests-four-journalists-are-
set-face-trial-month/; William Morris, “‘The jury made the right decision’: 
Reporter Andrea Sahouri acquitted in trial stemming from arrest as she 
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pepper spray.121 Sahouri countered that she repeatedly told 
Wilson she was a member of the press. Sahouri was charged 
with failure to disperse and interference with official acts. 
Her case, which was the first to go to trial in relation to the 
Floyd protests, ended after three days when a six-member jury 
acquitted her on both charges.
Several negative effects arose from Sahouri’s arrest and 
prosecution. First, she endured physical violence by police, 
including being pepper sprayed and forcibly zip tied. Second, 
her ability to cover the protests and other stories was 
undermined because she was either detained or in a courtroom 
instead of out on the beat. Finally, her case implicates press 
freedom broadly as it may chill other reporters who might 
fear of retribution while covering similar newsworthy events. 
The prospect of long trials and burdensome legal fees can be 
especially problematic for smaller news outlets. 
Taken together, these negative effects demonstrate how 
law enforcement and the government more broadly can, and 
do, intrude upon and interfere with newsgathering through 
arrests, use of force, and prosecutions. Significantly, such 
actions have continued throughout the first decades of the 
21st century, including in relation to highly newsworthy events 
around racial justice protests. This is in large part attributable 
to a lack of special privileges and constitutional protections 
for newsgathering, coupled with the deference given to law 
enforcement by the courts.
V. Solutions
The protests following the death of George Floyd were 
incredibly significant in spreading racial justice messages across 
the United States. For this reason and others, Andrea Sahouri, 
and journalists like her, were present to cover them. Although 
protections for freedom of speech benefit members of the 
press, journalists undertake discrete actions that go beyond free 
speech and implicate the Press Clause. 
On one hand, the legal landscape does provide protections 
for the press’ interests. In the Pentagon Papers case, the Court 
recognized First Amendment protection from government 
censorship. The Court has also provided First Amendment 
protections for publication of lawfully obtained, truthful 
information.122 Additionally, the Court has provided protection 
for circulation and dissemination of materials by the press 
under the First Amendment,123 as well as First Amendment 
protection for print publications’ editorial control.124
However, as detailed throughout this article, the Supreme 
Court has provided the press with little constitutional 
protection for newsgathering. It has declined to provide the 
press with special privileges related to access to information 
and locations, as well as against searches and seizures and 
liability under laws of general applicability. Thus, dicta by the 
Court about First Amendment protections for newsgathering, 
such as in Branzburg, are often empty rhetoric.125 This is 
121 Tyler Kingkade, Iowa reporter goes to trial over arrest during Black 
Lives Matter protest, nBC newS (March 8, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/us-news/iowa-reporter-goes-trial-over-arrest-during-black-lives-
matter-n1260068.
122 See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Oklahoma 
Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Smith 
v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); Florida Star v. B. J. 
F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
123 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
124 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). See also Arkansas 
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
125 Chemerinsky, supra note 19.
further reinforced by courts favoring law enforcement interests 
over newsgathering interests. Although §1983 actions do 
provide a theoretical legal remedy, and the press does receive 
some limited privileges and rights not available to members 
of the general public from other sources, more can be done 
to promote and protect newsgathering from government 
interference.
This article does not argue that the press should be allowed 
to interfere with law enforcement activities or have unlimited 
access to locations and information. But at the same time, 
there should be concern not just about press intrusion into 
law enforcement, but also police intrusion into newsgathering. 
That includes arrests, use of force, and threats when journalists 
are trying to do their jobs. As Justice Black wrote in his 
concurrence in New York Times v. United States, if the press is 
to serve the governed, the government cannot interfere with it. 
“Government” includes law enforcement.
Thus, courts need to give greater deference to press 
interests. Without meaningful First Amendment protections 
for newsgathering, government can, and will, continue to 
undermine the press’ ability to cover noteworthy events, 
especially when the police are present. Prosecutors are not 
sufficiently deterred from targeting journalists like Sahouri 
with criminal sanctions. Legal defenses for newsgathering as 
they currently exist are not sufficient to guarantee a favorable 
outcome. In the Sahouri case, the journalist was acquitted. But 
what if a court or jury sides with police officers, citing a lack of 
First Amendment protections for newsgathering?
There are three tangible ways in which the courts and 
legislature, as well as members of the press and police, can 
begin to rectify the Branzburg precedent. First, judicial action 
is ideal. If the Press Clause is to have any meaning, there 
need to be ways and circumstances under which the press 
receives greater protections than the public in the course of 
newsgathering. This is not to say that these protections will be 
absolute. But the claim in Branzburg that newsgathering is not 
without First Amendment protection cannot be simply empty 
rhetoric. It needs to have practical application.
A potential judicial solution is temporary restraining orders 
(TRO) exempting journalists from curfews, dispersal orders or 
other police actions. This would prevent law enforcement from 
arresting or using force against members of the press who are 
covering protests. For example, on April 16, 2021, in the wake 
of protests arising from the deadly shooting of Daunte Wright 
by Brooklyn Center, Minn. police, federal Judge Wilhelmina M. 
Wright of the District of Minnesota issued a TRO preventing 
specific Minnesota law enforcement agencies from “arresting, 
threatening to arrest, or using physical force—including through 
use of flash bang grenades, non-lethal projectiles, riot batons, 
or any other means—directed against any person whom they 
know or reasonably should know is a Journalist . . ., unless [law 
enforcement has] probable cause to believe that such individual 
has committed a crime.”126 The order also exempted journalists 
from dispersal orders, including during curfews from which 
members of the press were already exempt.
Although Wright’s order was a step in the right direction, 
it had several limitations. First, Wright acknowledged in 
126 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining 
Order, Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-cv-1302 (WMW/DTS) (April 
16, 2021), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20618077/tro-
minnesota-journalists-at-protests-goyette.pdf. See also Members of the 
Press Detained and Targeted with Use of Force by Law Enforcement 
Despite Court Order Amid Racial Justice Protests, Silha Center for 
the StuDy of MeDia ethiCS & l. (April 19, 2021), https://hsjmc.umn.edu/
news/2021-04-18-members-press-detained-and-targeted-use-force-law-
enforcement-despite-court-order.
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her order that similar injunctions necessarily included the 
requirement that journalists “refrain from impeding law 
enforcement activities.” Her order, and those like it, related to 
dispersal orders, not to police activities more broadly. Second, 
the TRO did not apply to all law enforcement agencies, and 
at least a dozen different ones responded to the protests in 
Brooklyn Center. Finally, even if plaintiffs successfully obtain 
a TRO — which is not guaranteed — such court orders cannot 
and do not completely ensure that arrests, attacks, and threats 
will cease. Despite the District of Minnesota’s TRO, law 
enforcement continued to arrest and detain journalists, some 
of whom were required to submit to photographs of their press 
credentials and faces. Other journalists were targeted by law 
enforcement use of chemical agents.
Justice John Paul Stevens’ reasoning in Houchins is 
instructive. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens contended 
that newsgathering should receive constitutional protection 
against government intrusion.127 He wrote that the First 
Amendment protects “not only the dissemination but also the 
receipt of information.”128 Justice Stevens also asserted that 
it is “not sufficient . . . that the channels of communication be 
free of governmental restraints. Without some protection for 
the acquisition of information about the operation of public 
institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the process 
of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be 
stripped of its substance.”129 Therefore, Justice Stevens opined 
that “information gathering is entitled to some measure of 
constitutional protection.”130 By following Justice Steven’s 
reasoning, the press would receive preferential treatment, or at 
least greater deference, in gathering news.
Second, if the Supreme Court and/or lower courts fail to 
recognize First Amendment protection for newsgathering 
function, Congress and state legislatures need to step in and 
pass legislation that will do so. In fact, there is precedent for 
Congress taking actions to protect press interests. In direct 
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zurcher denying 
journalists First Amendment protection that enhanced their 
existing Fourth Amendment rights, Congress passed the PPA 
to curtail searches and seizures in newsrooms.131 Statutory 
protection for newsgathering, whether by Congress or state 
legislatures, would be a step in the right direction to prevent 
government intrusion into freedom of the press. Additionally, 
Congress could pass legislation restricting federal funding to 
law enforcement agencies that fail to take adequate steps to 
ensure they are not inappropriately arresting, attacking, or 
otherwise interfering with journalists who are gathering news.
Finally, and perhaps most realistically, change needs to 
happen “on the ground.” Law enforcement across the United 
States needs to receive better training on how to interact with 
journalists at chaotic scenes like protests. Similar messages 
could also extend to public officials, who should speak publicly 
about the important and necessary role of newsgathering in 
the United States. Furthermore, scholars, advocacy groups, 
and others can, and should, bring together members of the 
press and police in different communities so that they can 
talk through their respective roles, differences and concerns, 
127 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
128 Id. at 30.
129 Id. at 32. Justice Stevens cited Justice William Brennan’s concurring 
opinion in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965): “The 
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing 
addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren 
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.” Stevens added, 
“It would be an even more barren market-place that had willing buyers and 
sellers and no meaningful information to exchange.”
130 Id. 
131 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(a). 
preferably before a crisis occurs. Ultimately, better training and 
communication between the press and police, as well as greater 
understanding and important purposes of newsgathering, can 
help prevent, even to a small extent, arrests, use of force, and 
prosecutions of journalists.
The Press Clause is not going to be revitalized overnight. 
Even if some or all of these proposed solutions are adopted, 
arrests, use of force, threats, and prosecutions of journalists 
in the context of newsgathering will not magically go away. 
But the status quo has become untenable as journalists 
continue to face these consequences for simply doing their 
jobs. Court precedent dating back to Branzburg in 1972 has 
failed to adequately protect newsgathering and has instead 
prioritized law enforcement functions. Law enforcement and 
government interests are important, but so too are those of 
the press and public. As it stands, law enforcement interests 
are often given too much deference in the absence of special 
privileges/protections for the press. Instead, in order to serve 
the public interest, the press should be able to cover protests 
lawfully without fear of arrest or prosecution for doing so. The 
legacy of Branzburg and its progeny — perhaps unintended — 
is that journalists do not have that assurance.
Ultimately, better balancing of the press’ and law 
enforcements’ interests benefits not only those institutions. 
Decreasing government intrusion into press freedoms also 
benefits the American public. Put simply, if the press cannot 
properly cover newsworthy events and report on police 
wrongdoing, it is the public that suffers. Without press reporting 
on protests, the public will not receive a complete view of 
what takes place, nor will important messages such as those 
related to racial justice be amplified for the public to hear. 
Furthermore, if the press cannot report, for example, on police 
use of force against protesters, the public will be deprived of 
an important accountability mechanism that can help lead to 
reform and change. Finally, by targeting members of the press, 
law enforcement further undermines public confidence and 
trust in it, making it even more challenging to properly serve the 
public, especially those from underrepresented communities. 
Taken together, the public needs the press and police to operate 
at their best, which is undermined when the two parties are in 
conflict. 
*     *     *
Justice Black’s departure from the Supreme Court in 1971 
removed perhaps the most ardent defender of freedom of 
the press to ever sit on the Court. This led, in part, to a series 
of rulings where the high court refused to recognize special 
privileges for newsgathering under the First Amendment. 
One result was that, in some cases, lower courts favored 
law enforcement interests over those of the press, allowing 
for greater government intrusion into newsgathering. This 
interference continues to lead to negative effects and harms, 
especially where journalists are arrested, jailed, and/or 
prosecuted for doing their jobs. This includes at racial justice 
protests where the press should be able to cover the crucially 
important messages from underrepresented communities, as 
well as to help the public hold law enforcement accountable. 
If action is not taken to address these harms, journalists will 
continue to be targeted by law enforcement, and face other 
forms of government interference. Ultimately, only by providing 
greater protections for newsgathering can Justice Black’s call 




Content Moderation and Constitutional Hurdles: 
First Amendment Limitations on Platform 
Regulation
O
n May 5, 2021, the Facebook Oversight Board, 
the body created by Facebook to resolve the 
company’s content removal decisions, issued its 
ruling on the indefinite suspension of President 
Donald Trump from the platform.1 Although the 
Oversight Board concluded that the initial decision to suspend 
President Trump following the January 6 insurrection was 
justified, the Board took issue with the platform’s “arbitrary”2 
procedure in doing so. Instead of making the suspension final, 
it kicked back that determination to Facebook.3 On June 4, 
2021, Facebook announced that it would suspend Trump’s 
accounts for at least two years.4 Legal experts, media analysts, 
and politicians on both sides of the aisle aired their grievances 
about the Board’s ruling, adding to an ongoing debate: do 
social media platforms do too little to combat a panoply of 
ills — misinformation5, harassment, and polarization, to name 
a few — or too much, removing marginalized groups and even 
presidents.6 Both alternatives underscore the same concern, 
however: private platforms’ power over online speech and 
discourse. 
In response to such concerns, several proposals have 
been introduced in the United States to curb how companies 
moderate their platforms. These proposals fall into three 
general approaches: (1) requirements that platforms host 
users and content with which they disagree; (2) modifications 
to Section 230, a federal statute that currently immunizes 
platforms from traditional speech torts, such as defamation, 
arising from user-generated content; and (3) limits on how 
platforms recommend or rank content to users. This article 
outlines each approach and highlights how each may come into 
conflict with the First Amendment. 
I. Proposals Requiring Platforms Host Content 
On April 5, 2021, the United States Supreme Court vacated 
a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in Biden v. Knight and instructed the lower court to dismiss 
the case as moot.7 The Second Circuit had previously upheld 
1 Jack M. Balkin & Kate Klonick, Facebook’s Oversight Board was 
supposed to let Facebook off the hook. It didn’t, waSh. PoSt (May 6, 2021) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/05/06/facebook-oversight-
board-trump/. 
2 Facebook Oversight Board, Case Decision 2021-001-FB-FBR (May 5, 
2021), available at https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/FB-691QAM-
HJ. 
3 Id. “The Board’s role is to ensure that Facebook’s rules and processes 
are consistent with its content policies, its values and its human rights 
commitments. In applying a vague, standardless penalty and then referring 
this case to the Board to resolve, Facebook seeks to avoid its responsibili-
ties.”
4 Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Says Trump’s Ban Will 
Last at Least 2 Years, n.y. tiMeS (June 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/06/04/technology/facebook-trump-ban.html.
5 See e.g., Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From 
Myanmar’s Military, n.y. tiMeS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html. 
6 See e.g., Mathew Ingram, Social networks accused of censoring Palestin-
ian content, ColuMBia JournaliSM rev. (May 19, 2021), https://www.cjr.org/
the_media_today/social-networks-accused-of-censoring-palestinian-con-
tent.php.  
7 Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220 
(2021), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pd-
f/20-197_5ie6.pdf. 
a district court decision finding that then-President Donald 
Trump violated Twitter users’ First Amendment rights when he 
blocked them from seeing or responding to his personal Twitter 
account, which he used for official business.8 The Supreme 
Court’s decision to vacate the Second Circuit was brief — one 
sentence — and unanimous. However, Justice Thomas took 
the opportunity to write a concurring opinion in which he 
reflected upon “the concentrated control”9 of digital platforms. 
In a curious twist for the conservative justice, he mused on 
how the use of common carriage and public accommodation 
doctrines could be used to compel private, digital platforms to 
host content with which they disagree. “If part of the problem is 
private, concentrated control over online content and platforms 
available to the public, then part of the solution may be found in 
doctrines that limit the right of a private company to exclude,” 
Justice Thomas wrote.10 
Much of Justice Thomas’s twelve-page concurrence explores 
whether platforms could be classified as common carriers 
in order to curb their ability to ban or suspend individuals. 
If a company is considered a common carrier, it is generally 
required to afford neutral, nondiscriminatory access to its 
services.11 Justice Thomas argued that digital platforms may 
be akin to critical infrastructure such as toll bridges, railroads, 
or telephone networks that are classified as common carriers 
and must provide service to all customers alike, without 
discrimination.12 Such regulations may be justified, Justice 
Thomas wrote, “when a carrier possesses substantial market 
power”13 or when a “company holds itself out . . . as carry[ing] 
goods for everyone as a business.”14 Digital platforms are 
similar to traditional telephone infrastructure, Justice Thomas 
argued, because they “‘carry’ information from one user to 
another”15 and “hold themselves out as organizations that focus 
on distributing the speech of the broader public”16 — rather 
than speaking themselves. Thomas also noted that platforms 
have dominant market share due to “network effects”17 that 
may allow for common carriage requirements. “[I]t stands to 
reason that if Congress may demand that telephone companies 
operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of ‘digital 
platforms,’” Justice Thomas argued.18 
The concurrence echoes a growing concern raised by 
Republican politicians that  platforms possess an “anti-
conservative bias”19 in removing content, and a belief that 
8 Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F. 3d 226 
(2019).
9 Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220 
(2021) (Thomas, J., concurring).
10 Id. 
11 See e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017). 
12 Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220 
(2021) (Thomas, J., concurring).




17 Id. at 7.
18 Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)). See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
19 David McCabe, Evidence of anti-conservative bias by platforms 





regulation is needed to ensure that platforms act “neutrally” in 
their content moderation practices.  For example, on May 24, 
2021, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis signed a Social Media Platform 
bill that would fine social media companies $25,000 to $250,000 
per day for removing Florida political candidates from their 
platforms.20 Three days later, trade industry groups NetChoice 
and the Computer and Communications Industry Association 
(CCIA), whose members include Twitter and Facebook, filed 
a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Florida challenging the law on First Amendment grounds. 
The complaint argued that the law’s restrictions on content 
moderation violate platforms’ free speech “by compelling them 
to host — and punishing them for taking virtually any action 
to remove or make prominent — even highly objectionable or 
illegal content, no matter how much that content may conflict 
with their terms or policies.”21
Laws that compel platforms to host users and content that 
they would otherwise take down are reminiscent of a set of 
rules that have previously applied to broadcast media called 
the Fairness Doctrine.22 Established in 1949, the Fairness 
Doctrine required broadcasters to: (1) cover controversial 
issues of public importance, and (2) provide a diversity of 
perspectives on such issues.23 At the time of the Doctrine’s 
20 Act effective July 1, 2021, ch. 2021-32, 2021 Fla. Laws 7072, available 
at http://laws.flrules.org/files/Ch_2021-032.pdf. (The law would fine social 
media companies $25,000 per day for deplatforming Florida candidates 
for non-statewide office and $250,000 per day for deplatforming statewide 
candidates. The law also includes exemptions for “journalistic enterprises” 
as well as companies that own theme parks, such as Disney.); See also, 
Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2020) 
(A bill introduced requiring a company would have to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that it does not, and did not in the preceding two-year 
period, moderate user content in a politically biased manner in order to 
receive Section 230 protection).
21 Complaint, NetChoice LLC v. Moody, N.D. Fla., No. 4:21-cv-00220 (May 
27, 2021), available at https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/
document/NETCHOICELLCetalvMOODYetalDocketNo421cv00220NDFla-
May272021CourtDo/1?1622212641. 
22 I do not attempt to solve the normative arguments surrounding the 
Fairness Doctrine here. Some have argued that the Doctrine emphasized 
false equivalency on controversial issues, was perhaps used as a political 
tool for controversial viewpoints, and had a chilling effect on broadcast-
ers’ news coverage. However, on the other side, there exists arguments 
that the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine led to increased polarization of 
media, citing the rise of conservative radio as evidence. See generally, 
Philip M. Napoli, Back from the Dead (Again): The Specter of the Fairness 
Doctrine and its Lessons for Social Media Regulation, (forthcoming). 
It is unclear how such requirements would work at the scale needed for 
a large platform such as Facebook, however. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, 
Content Moderation At Scale Is Impossible: Recent Examples of Misun-
derstanding Context, teChDirt (Feb. 26, 2021) https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20210225/10365146316/content-moderation-scale-is-impossible-re-
cent-examples-misunderstanding-context.shtml. 
23 The foundation for the Fairness Doctrine was outlined years prior in 
the Radio Act of 1927. The Act highlighted that at the time there was a 
scarcity of radio frequencies and therefore those broadcast stations that 
were granted a government license to operate must do so for the “public 
interest, convenience, and necessity” of the citizenry. Radio Act of 1927, 47 
U.S.C. §§ 81-119 (1927). Shortly thereafter, the Federal Radio Commission 
(which later became the Federal Communication Commission in the Com-
munications Act of 1934) put forth the view that “public interest requires 
ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views, and the 
commission believes that the principle applies…to all discussions of issues 
of importance to the public.” 3 Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. 
Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev’d on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993, cert. dismissed, 
281 U.S. 706 (1930). In 1938, a former radio employee named Lawrence J. 
Flynn challenged the license of radio stations WAAB and WNAC in Boston, 
asserting that the stations’ owners were using the stations to air one-sided 
political viewpoints and attacks against politicians. Flynn created a com-
pany called Mayflower Broadcasting and tried to get the FCC to award him 
WAAB’s license. The FCC refused. However, in doing so the commission 
inception, few broadcasters were given government licenses 
to operate spectrum frequencies and policymakers were 
wary of broadcasters’ propensity to air only messages with 
which they agreed.24 Within this context, policymakers were 
particularly adamant that the medium must give listeners and 
viewers access to a diversity of viewpoints and topics. Although 
the Doctrine was largely eliminated in 1987, its approach has 
garnered support once again in today’s environment of digital 
platforms with the capacity to inform a massive, global user-
base.25 
Proposed common carriage and pseudo-Fairness Doctrine 
regulations, such as requiring social media platforms to host 
certain users (as the Florida law imposes), would face an 
uphill constitutional battle, however. Courts have upheld such 
regulatory efforts only in situations where private companies 
either hold themselves out as neutral conduits of information, 
or when they possess critical control over access to a certain 
medium or technology. It is difficult to imagine modern day 
digital platforms falling under either classification. 
A court most recently upheld common carriage requirements 
for telecommunications providers in the context of net 
neutrality. In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission 
issued the Open Internet Order, which formally classified 
internet service providers (ISPs) as common carriers and 
prohibited them from blocking or throttling lawful internet 
traffic.26 In upholding the order,27 Chief Judge Sri Srinivasan 
and Judge David S. Tatel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit emphasized that ISPs could avoid the burdens 
of common carrier status provided they had exercised their 
First Amendment rights to curate their services. “[T]he 
rule does not apply to an ISP holding itself out as providing 
something other than a neutral, indiscriminate pathway — i.e., 
an ISP making sufficiently clear to potential customers that 
it provides a filtered service involving the ISP’s exercise of 
‘editorial intervention,’” the judges wrote.28 But in this case, 
broadband providers had represented to their subscribers 
that their services would connect to “substantially all Internet 
endpoints.”29 The common carrier status and neutrality 
requirements thus “require[d] ISPs to act in accordance with 
their customers’ legitimate expectations.”30
Unlike ISPs, and contrary to Justice Thomas’s 
characterization, most digital platforms do exercise “editorial 
intervention.” Content moderation policies are often outlined 
in community standards guidelines, and platforms even 
market their content moderation preferences to attract users. 
made a ruling that came to be known as the Mayflower Doctrine which 
declared that radio stations must remain neutral in matters of news and 
politics and prohibiting them from giving editorial support to any particular 
political position or candidate. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 
(1941). The Mayflower rule prohibiting editorializing was later repealed in 
1949 and replaced with the Fairness Doctrine. FCC, rePort of the CoMMiS-
Sion in the Matter of eDitorializing 1y BroaDCaSt liCenSeeS (1949); See also 
aPPliCaBility of the fairneSS DoCtrine in the hanDling of ControverSial iSSueS 
of PuBliC iMPortanCe, 29 feD. reg. 10426 (1964). 
24 Id. 
25 See generally Philip M. Napoli, SoCial MeDia anD the PuBliC intereSt 
(2019). 
26 In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet (Protecting 
and Promoting the Open Internet), 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5607– 08 (2015). 
27 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F. 3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
28 Id. at 389. 
29 Id. at 388.
30 Id. at 391. Notably, then-D.C. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh argued in 
his dissenting opinion in the case that ISPs did not qualify as common 
carriers and that requiring burdening them with the net neutrality rules 
infringed upon their First Amendment rights. Id. at 418-26 (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
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For example, Parler, a social media platform focused on 
conservative politics, has touted that its editorial decisions 
are “less-partisan” than Facebook’s and more “free-speech” 
friendly.31 Digital platforms frequently make value-laden 
decisions about who or what content to remove, as Facebook’s 
decision to suspend former President Trump indefinitely 
illustrates. Congress has also signaled the specific intention 
that platforms should more actively moderate content when 
it passed Section 230, a federal law that immunizes platforms 
from torts, such as defamation, based on user-generated 
content, and that protects platforms’ moderation practices.32
Consumers have also come to expect different community 
guidelines and content moderation practices on different 
platforms. For example, unlike more general social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, which strive to 
appeal to a wide user-base and impose restrictions on posting 
nudity, OnlyFans, a subscription-based content sharing 
platform, rose to prominence by allowing nude content.33 Such 
decisions reflect platforms’ editorial and curational choices in 
their content offerings. Common carriage burdens on digital 
platforms would be likely to infringe on companies’ own First 
Amendment rights to exercise such editorial discretion over 
what content they allow on their platform.
Furthermore, courts have upheld “must carry” and neutrality 
requirements for private communications companies only 
when those companies have possessed physical, infrastructural 
control over access to a certain medium or technology — 
not, as Justice Thomas suggests in his concurrence, when 
a private company has a large market share. The context of 
Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, which Justice Thomas cites, is 
illustrative here. At issue in Turner were regulations requiring 
cable companies to carry local broadcast channels.34 In the 
early 1990s it had become clear that cable television would 
directly compete with broadcasting for market share. Motivated 
in large part by concerns over cable operators’ refusal to 
carry local broadcast stations, potentially hindering access 
to free television programming for millions of Americans,35 
31 Rebecca Heilweil, Parler, the “free speech” social network, explained, 
vox (Jan. 11, 2021) https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/11/24/21579357/parl-
er-app-trump-twitter-facebook-censorship. 
32 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). See infra section 2 for more information regard-
ing Section 230. 
33 Matilda Boseley, ‘Everyone and their mum is on it’: OnlyFans booms 
in popularity during the pandemic, guarDian (Dec. 23, 2020), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/dec/23/everyone-and-their-mum-is-
on-it-onlyfans-boomed-in-popularity-during-the-pandemic. 
34 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). Importantly, the Court rejected the argument that the must 
carry rules were content-based and therefore required strict scrutiny 
review. Rather, the majority found that the rules were content-neutral even 
though the rules were clearly speaker-based as they distinguished between 
cable operators and broadcast stations and even among broadcast stations 
themselves. The Court’s reasoning here was that “the must carry rules, on 
their face, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the 
content of speech.” 114 S. Ct. at 2460. The Court also dismissed the argu-
ment that Congress’ intent underlying the rules was content-based even as 
Congress’ emphasized concerns over “local news[,] public-affairs program-
ming and other local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate.” 
114 S. Ct. at 2455. Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion took issue with 
this finding and insisted that the must carry rules were based on content as 
they specifically favored television programming with “a local character.” 
Ironically, Justice Thomas joined this opinion. 114 S. Ct. at 2479. The court 
applied the intermediate test set forth in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367 (1968) (requiring that speech regulation serve important government 
interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest).
35 Forty percent of Americans lacked a cable connection at the time and 
had to rely on broadcast for free television programming. The notion that 
Congress enacted the Cable Television Protection Act of 1992, 
which imposed must-carry obligations on cable operators that 
required them to distribute local broadcast signals.36 The Turner 
Broadcasting Company challenged the provisions as content-
based regulations interfering with its right to exercise editorial 
discretion in choosing which programming to carry.37
In determining whether the must carry requirements would 
be constitutional under the First Amendment,38 the Court 
emphasized that “[w]hen an individual subscribes to cable, the 
physical connection between the television set and the cable 
network gives the cable operator bottleneck, or gatekeeper, 
control over most (if not all) of the television programming that 
is channeled into the subscriber’s home” (emphasis added).39 
The Court stressed that the First Amendment “does not disable 
the government from taking steps to ensure that private 
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical 
pathway of communication, the free flow of information and 
ideas” (emphasis added).40
Additionally, the Supreme Court has found that the presence 
of market dominance alone is not enough to overcome a private 
company’s First Amendment right to editorial discretion.41 
The Court addressed concerns over market concentration in 
the newspaper industry in striking down as unconstitutional 
a Florida statute that required newspapers to publish without 
cost the reply of any political candidate they had criticized, or 
face criminal penalties. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that 
because the newspaper business was highly concentrated, 
“the power to inform the American people and shape public 
opinion” was “place[d] in few hands.42 Burger also noted that 
the problem of concentration could not be easily fixed by the 
ordinary processes of market competition given the steep 
barriers to entry that existed in the newspaper industry.43 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that concerns over market 
concentration were not sufficient, and held that the criminal 
statute unconstitutionally intruded into the function and 
autonomy of editors. Although the Court had previously 
upheld similar requirements for the broadcast sector under 
the Fairness Doctrine, the Court emphasized that in addition 
to market dominance, broadcast companies were awarded 
government licenses to utilize spectrum frequencies not 
[physically] available to all.44 Unlike the broadcast industry, 
where physical entry into the market was contingent 
upon spectrum licenses, theoretically anyone could start a 
newspaper. 45
Although concerns over anticompetitive behavior 
and market dominance of some online platforms may be 
cable television would win in the marketplace over broadcasting and result 
in over forty percent of Americans losing free television seems unrealistic. 
How much broadcasting interest-groups account for the passage of the 
must-carry provisions is an important question beyond the purview of this 
article. See e.g., Cass Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 
yale l. J. 1757, 1766 (1994).
36 Section 4 required cable providers to set aside as many as one-third of 
their channels for commercial broadcast stations. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)
(A)-(B). Section 5 required cable providers carry local “noncommercial 
educational television stations,” in other words, public broadcast channels. 
47 U.S.C. § 535. 
37 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 819 F.Supp. 32 (D.D.C.1993) (granting 
summary judgment upholding the rules as constitutional). 
38 The provisions were later upheld in Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC (II), 
520 U.S. 180 (1997).
39 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2470 (1994).
40 Id. 
41 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
42 Id. at 250
43 Id. at 251.
44 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
45 Id. 
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warranted,46 digital platforms do not possess the same 
physical control over what content appears on the internet as 
do broadcast licensees. Platforms like Facebook, Reddit, or 
Twitter, although visible to consumers, exist at the application 
layer of the internet — the layer used by end-user software 
services.47 For example, Reddit does not have control over 
Twitter, and vice versa. Furthermore — perhaps even more than 
is the case with the print newspaper industry — theoretically, 
anyone can start a platform, as the rise of several “niche” 
platforms illustrates.48 Therefore, although efforts to crack 
down on platform “bias” are politically in vogue, it is likely 
that requiring platforms to host users and content with which 
they disagree would be constitutionally suspect under the First 
Amendment. 
II. Modifications for Platform Immunity Under Section 
230 
Passed as part of the Communications Decency Act in 1996, 
Section 230 provides that platforms are not legally liable for 
most user-generated content and immunizes platforms from 
traditional speech torts, such as defamation, as long as the 
platform did not help create or develop the content.49 The law 
does have important exceptions to its immunity provision, 
however. It does not provide any defense for claims arising 
under federal criminal law, intellectual property law, certain 
laws involving prostitution or sex trafficking, or the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.50 But importantly, Section 230 
also provides that platforms are free to moderate content 
hosted on their platform.51 This “Good Samaritan” provision 
grants platforms discretion to take down content and impose 
proactive measures like providing fact-check flags and 
moderation filters. Importantly, Section 230 covers a range of 
online services that publish third-party content, from social 
media platforms to restaurant review sites and web blogs that 
have comment sections.52 
It is important to understand the background and legal 
context of Section 230 before addressing current proposals to 
modify the law. Under traditional common-law principles, a 
person who publishes a false and defamatory statement made 
by another bears the same liability for the statement as if he 
or she had originally made the statement. The theory behind 
“publisher” liability is that a publisher has the knowledge, 
46 John D. McKinnon, These are the U.S. Antitrust Cases Facing Google, 
Facebook, and Others, wall St. J. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/these-are-the-u-s-antitrust-cases-facing-google-facebook-and-oth-
ers-11608150564. 
47 Regulating companies further down the “stack” and closer to the infra-
structure layer such as cloud services or app stores may raise less First 
Amendment issues, however. See e.g., Joan Donovan, Navigating the Tech 
Stack: When, Where, and How Should We Moderate Content?, Centre for 
International Governance Innovation Essay Series (Oct. 28, 2019), https://
www.cigionline.org/articles/navigating-tech-stack-when-where-and-how-
should-we-moderate-content/. 
48 Ilker Koksal, The Rise of Niche and Vertical Social Networks, forBeS 
(Dec. 21 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilkerkoksal/2019/12/21/the-
rise-of-niche-and-vertical-social-networks/?sh=6d18fd873582. A large sum 
of capital is not necessarily required, although there may be other costs 
like user-data. See Ryan Johnston, Assessing Monopoly Power or Domi-
nance in Platform Markets: A Summary, DiSruPtive CoMPetition ProJeCt 
Blog (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.project-disco.org/competition/021320-as-
sessing-monopoly-power-or-dominance-in-platform-markets-a-summary.
49 42 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). See also Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th 
Cir. May 4, 2021) (holding that Section 230 does not immunize a platform 
from a product liability suit if the Internet service is defectively designed).
50 42 U.S.C. § 230(e). 
51 Id. § 230(c)(2). 
52 Id. § 230(b). 
opportunity, and ability to exercise editorial control over the 
content of its publications. Publisher liability applies to book 
and newspaper publishers who can be held liable for content 
appearing within their pages. 
On the other hand, liability for distributors, such as 
newsstands, bookstores, and libraries, is much more limited. 
Distributors are generally not held liable for the content they 
distribute. The theory for repudiating “distributor” liability is 
that distributors would be forced to read every publication 
before distributing it. This requirement almost certainly would 
slow the flow of information to the public. Furthermore, it 
would be difficult for distributors to know whether content 
is actionable because they would have to independently 
determine whether it was false and defamatory. It is likely that 
if distributors were held liable for all published content, they 
would probably err on the side of caution and refrain from 
releasing questionable material to the public. As explained 
in the Smith case below, this could lead to excessive self-
censorship. 
Section 230 changed these traditional rules for online 
platforms and was inspired by two libel suits against two 
different platforms in the 1990s. One platform, CompuServe, 
provided subscribers with access to specialized “forums” 
that were run by third parties.53 Importantly, CompuServe did 
not review the content of a forum before it was published. 
When it was sued over a defamatory statement that appeared 
on its “Rumorville” forum, CompuServe argued that it was a 
distributor rather than a publisher under traditional libel law.54 
The Southern District of New York agreed and dismissed the 
claims against CompuServe, stating that the platform had no 
knowledge of or editorial control over content that was posted 
to the forum.55 
Four years later, in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy,56 a New 
York state court came to the opposite conclusion. Prodigy 
maintained several online bulletin boards and held itself out as 
a “computer friendly” network57 as it heavily moderated content 
published to its boards. An unidentified user of Prodigy’s Money 
Talk bulletin board created a post which claimed that securities 
investment banking firm Stratton Oakmont and its president 
Danny Porush had committed criminal and fraudulent acts. 
Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy as well as the unidentified 
poster for libel.  Because Prodigy enforced community 
guidelines and exercised editorial control over content, the 
court ruled that Prodigy was more akin to a publisher than a 
distributor and could be found liable for false and defamatory 
content appearing on its online bulletin board.58 
The split between CompuServe and Prodigy raised the 
specter that any effort by a platform to moderate user-
generated content would subject it to a higher risk of liability 
if it failed to eliminate all defamatory material than if it made 
no effort to moderate user-generated content at all.59 Chris 
Cox (R-Calif.) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), the authors of Section 
53 Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
54 Id. at 138. 
55 Id. at 141. 
56 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
57 In one article highlighted by the Court, PRODIGY stated: “We make 
no apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the culture of the 
millions of American families we aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible 
newspaper does less when it chooses the type of advertising it publishes, 
the letters it prints, the degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors 
tolerate.”
58 Id.
59 For background on Section 230 see, Jeff koSSeff, the twenty-Six worDS 
that CreateD the internet (2019). 
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230, sought to reverse this arguably perverse outcome by 
introducing legislation that would immunize platforms from 
liability for user-generated content while providing legal cover 
to platforms that chose to moderate content. The hope was 
that platforms would, or at least could, try to remove harmful 
content provided those efforts did not expose them to legal 
risk.60 
Section 230 has become more controversial in recent years, 
due in part to rulings in favor of unsympathetic platforms.61 For 
example, in 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
affirmed a District Court of Massachusetts ruling dismissing 
a lawsuit filed by three victims of child sex trafficking against 
the online forum Backpage.com.62 Backpage hosted classified 
ads, the majority of which featured commercial sex. The 
First Circuit’s unanimous opinion held that despite financially 
benefiting Backpage, the advertisements were posted by users 
of the site and therefore Section 230 immunity applied.63 
However, after a Senate investigation revealed that Backpage 
employees had helped traffickers create ads, Congress 
responded in 2018 by amending Section 230.64 The House bill, 
the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), and the Senate 
bill, the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA), created 
an exception to Section 230 if a platform or website was found 
to “promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person.”65 
FOSTA/SESTA was signed into law by then-President Trump in 
April 2018, and its constitutionality has since been challenged 
in several lawsuits.66 Free speech advocates have argued that 
FOSTA/SESTA violates the First Amendment by punishing 
protected speech and that the words “promote or facilitate” are 
both overbroad and vague. For example, in Woodhull Freedom 
Foundation et al. v. United States,67 the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation has argued on behalf of plaintiffs, Alex Andrews, 
a director of several sex worker advocacy organizations, and 
Eric Koszyk, a licensed massage therapist, that FOSTA/SESTA 
“broadly sweeps up a host of protected speech within its 
prohibitions, many of which are not defined. Further, the terms 
in the law are so vague that it’s unclear what exactly Congress 
sought to prohibit, creating uncertainty for many Internet 
speakers as to whether what they say creates liability under the 
law.”68 As of this writing, Woodhull Freedom Foundation et al. 
is ongoing.69
In 2020, legislators on both sides of the aisle introduced 
numerous bills to modify or repeal outright Section 230.70 
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Dirty 
World of Entertainment, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014).
62 Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding that 
Section 230(e)(1) only excludes federal criminal prosecutions, not civil 
lawsuits predicated on federal criminal law and that the advertisements 
were generated by third parties).
63 Id.
64 Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of Online Sex Trafficking: Hearing 
before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg24930/pdf/CHRG-
115shrg24930.pdf.
65 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018).
66 See, e.g., U.S. v. Martono, 2021 WL 39584 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2021); Wood-
hull Freedom Found. v. U.S., 2020 WL 398625 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2020).
67 Woodhull Freedom Found. v. U.S., 2020 WL 398625 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 
2020).
68 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Our Cases Press Release, Woodhull 
Freedom Foundation et al. v. United States, https://www.eff.org/cases/
woodhull-freedom-foundation-et-al-v-united-states.
69 But see, U.S. v. Martono, 2021 WL 39584 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2021); (finding 
that the words “promote” or “facilitate” are sufficiently narrow). 
70 For a detailed list of legislative proposals see, All the Ways Congress 
Wants to Change Section 230, Slate future tenSe Blog (Mar. 23, 2021) 
Several bills focused on limiting the scope of the law by 
restricting the types of activities protected.71 For example, 
under the Safeguarding Against Fraud, Exploitation, Threats, 
Extremism, and Consumer Harms (SAFE TECH) Act,72 
sponsored by Sens. Mark Warner (D-Va.), Mazie Hirono 
(D-Hawaii), and Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), companies 
would not be allowed to use a Section 230 defense for claims 
stemming from ads or other content they are paid to host. 
The SAFE TECH Act would also prevent platforms from using 
Section 230 as a defense in cases arising from civil rights, 
antitrust, stalking and harassment, human rights, and wrongful 
death claims.73
Other legislative proposals would impose new obligations 
on companies before they could use Section 230 as a defense. 
For example, under the Platform Accountability and Consumer 
Transparency (PACT) Act, sponsored by Brian Schatz 
(D-Hawaii) and John Thune (R-S.D.), before invoking Section 
230 protection, platforms would be required to publish an 
acceptable use policy that would detail the types of content 
the platform allows, explain how the platform enforces its 
content policies, and describe how users can report content 
that violates the platform’s policies or is illegal.74 The PACT 
Act would also require platforms to review and remove 
illegal or content that violates their policy within a specific 
timeframe.75 Other bills would impose additional obligations 
and requirements before a company could use a Section 
230 defense, such as reporting suspicious content regarding 
planning, committing, promoting, and facilitating terrorism and 
other violent crimes to the Department of Justice,76 or requiring 
that platforms moderate content in a “politically neutral” 




71 See, e.g., Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Tech-
nologies Act of 2020 (EARN IT) Act, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020) (amends 
Section 230 so that platforms cannot use Section 230 as a defense in state 
criminal cases and federal and state civil cases regarding the prolifera-
tion of child sexual abuse material, in the amended version, a provision 
was added to note that providers that use end-to-end encryption or are 
unable to decrypt communications will not face liability purely “because” 
these cybersecurity protections are built into the platform); Don’t Push 
My Buttons Act, S. 4756, 116th Cong. (2020) (amends Section 230 so that 
companies cannot use Section 230 as a defense if they collect user data 
and then use the data in an algorithm that delivers content to the user, 
unless a user knowingly and intentionally elects to receive such tailored 
content); Protecting Americans From Dangerous Algorithms Act, H.R. 
8636, 116th Cong. (2020) (amends Section 230 so that companies cannot 
use Section 230 as a defense in cases brought for civil rights violations 
or acts of international terrorism and if the company uses an algorithm 
that amplifies or recommends content relating directly to the case); Stop 
Suppressing Speech Act of 2020, S. 4828, 116th Cong. (2020)(limits Section 
230 protection to instances when companies moderate content only if it 
falls within three categories: harassment, illegal content, or violence and 
terrorism.); Safeguarding Against Fraud, Exploitation, Threats, Extremism, 
and Consumer Harms (SAFE TECH) Act. S.___, 117th Cong. (2021). 
72 Safeguarding Against Fraud, Exploitation, Threats, Extremism, and 
Consumer Harms (SAFE TECH) Act. S.___, 117th Cong. (2021).
73 Id. 
74 Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency (PACT) Act, S. 
4066, 116th Cong. (2020).
75 Id. 
76 See Something, Say Something Online Act of 2020, S. 4758, 116th Cong. 
(2020). 
77 See, e.g., Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th 
Cong. (2020) (In order to receive Section 230 protection a company would 
have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it does not, and did 
not in the preceding two-year period, moderate user content in a politically 
biased manner).
78 See e.g., S. 5085, 116th Cong. (2020)(this proposal was introduced in 
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However, as the Woodhull case illustrates, modifications to 
Section 230 may raise First Amendment issues and concerns. 
For example, revisions that vaguely limit the scope of Section 
230 or require strict takedown timeframes may cause risk-
averse platforms to exercise caution and suppress otherwise 
lawful user speech.79 Laws that encourage this type of behavior 
may violate the First Amendment, as evidenced by the 1959 
Supreme Court ruling in Smith v. California. At issue in 
Smith was a city ordinance that imposed strict liability on 
those in possession of obscene books.80 Eleazar Smith, a Los 
Angeles bookstore owner, was convicted under the statute for 
selling a copy of the pulp novel Sweeter Than Life. Smith had 
never read the book and had no knowledge that the book was 
considered obscene. The Court highlighted that the statute 
essentially required booksellers to read every book ever 
sold — an impossible proposition. The ordinance would also 
cause booksellers to err on the side of excluding any material 
that might be found objectionable. In overturning the law, the 
Court emphasized how laws incentivizing excessive caution 
by intermediaries “tend to restrict the public’s access to forms 
of the printed word which the State could not constitutionally 
suppress directly.”81 The Court went on to conclude that “[t]he 
bookseller’s self-censorship, compelled by the State, would 
be censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent 
for being privately administered.”82 Therefore, modifying 
Section 230 to encourage platforms — which deal with massive 
amounts of content83 — to suppress otherwise lawful speech 
may rise to the level of government censorship. 
Proposals to use Section 230 protection as leverage to 
encourage platforms to adopt a broader set of obligations 
may also create constitutional friction. For example, under 
the PACT Act, platforms would be required to create quarterly 
transparency reports outlining their actions in content 
moderation decisions.84 Such requirements may be considered 
unconstitutional compelled speech.  In 2019, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down a Maryland law 
that required newspapers and online platforms to publish on 
their websites and retain for state inspection the identity of 
those who purchased  political ads and how much they had 
paid.85 Although the Court noted the strong state interest in 
transparency, the Court found that the requirement to disclose 
the identity of the advertiser and the cost of placing the ad 
constituted compelled speech that infringed on editorial 
negotiations over COVID-19 relief. It would have increased the stimulus 
checks for COVID-19 from $600 to $2,000 in exchange for repealing Section 
230 in its entirety); Abandoning Online Censorship (AOC) Act, H.R. 8896, 
116th Cong. (2020). 
79 As Law Professor Daphne Keller explains, “Unclear speech laws 
applied to (and thus interpreted by) platforms will predictably chill 
speech differently than those same speech laws applied directly to 
speakers. A speaker may decide to say things that fall in a legal gray 
area — whether because she knows her words are justified by the facts, 
because she is committed to a cause.. . . A platform will almost always lack 
that knowledge, motivation, or bravery. Erring on the side of suppressing 
the user’s speech is safer.” Daphne Keller, Six Constitutional Hurdles for 
Platform Speech Regulation, the Center for internet anD SoCiety Blog 
(Jan. 22, 2021), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2021/01/six-constitution-
al-hurdles-platform-speech-regulation.
80 Smith v. Cal., 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
81 Id. at 154.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606 
(E.D. Pa. 2004); Mike Masnick, Content Moderation At Scale Is Impossible: 
Recent Examples of Misunderstanding Context, teChDirt (Feb. 26, 2021) 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210225/10365146316/content-modera-
tion-scale-is-impossible-recent-examples-misunderstanding-context.shtml. 
84 Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency (PACT) Act, S. 
4066 § 5(a)(2)(D), 116th Cong. (2020). 
85 See, e.g., Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019).
control. Therefore, although calls for modifying Section 
230 have become politically popular in the last few years, 
policymakers should consider how such modifications may 
conflict with the First Amendment.
III. Limits on How Platforms Recommend and Rank 
Content 
An increasingly popular approach with policymakers is to 
regulate how platforms and their algorithms recommend and 
rank users’ content. For example, one such proposal would 
revoke Section 230 immunity in cases where platforms use 
computational processes (such as algorithms) to recommend 
user content relating to support for international terrorism or 
civil rights abuses.86  Advocates of this approach argue that 
“free speech does not mean free reach”87 and that regulations 
are needed to diminish the spread of harmful or problematic 
content. 
Just as regulations aimed at requiring platforms to host 
or take down specific content would raise First Amendment 
issues, so too would regulations aimed at how platforms rank 
and recommend that content. Under the First Amendment, 
laws that regulate speech based on its content must meet 
a high standard of “strict scrutiny,” meaning that the law in 
question must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
government interest and must be the least restrictive means 
for achieving that interest.88  In striking down an FCC rule 
which required cable operators either to completely scramble 
or block channels that were primarily dedicated to sexually-
oriented programing or limit their transmission to the hours of 
10 pm to 6 am, the Supreme Court held that even though the 
regulation did not completely prohibit specific content (in this 
case, sexually-oriented content), it nevertheless singled out 
specific content for regulation.  “The distinction between laws 
burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree,” 
the Court stated before concluding that such “content-based 
burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-
based bans.”89 Therefore, it is likely that regulations aimed at 
limiting how certain information is ranked and recommended 
on digital platforms will also trigger strict scrutiny and need 
to be the least restrictive means in promoting a compelling 
government interest — a high standard to satisfy. 
Furthermore, because they are private companies, platforms 
also have their own First Amendment rights to exercise 
editorial discretion over what content they carry. Platforms 
often use automated processes through computerized 
algorithms to make decisions over what content to recommend 
to users, and, in the case of search engines, how to rank 
that content. So far, courts have characterized platforms’ 
algorithmic decisions as “in essence, editorial judgments about 
which political ideas to promote.”90 
86 Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act, H.R. 8636, 116th 
Cong. (2020). 
87 Renee Diresta, Free Speech is Not the Same As Free Reach, wireD (Aug. 
30, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/free-speech-is-not-the-same-as-free-
reach/.
88 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989).
89 United States v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 812 (1999). 
90 Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); See 
also Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007) 
(“The First Amendment guarantees an individual the right to free speech, 
‘a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what 
not to say.. . .’ [T]he injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff contravenes 
Defendants’ First Amendment rights.”); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., 
Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) 
(Google’s ranking decisions are “constitutionally protected opinions” that 
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The first case to examine a search engine’s First Amendment 
rights was Search King, Inc. v. Google.91 Search King was a 
search optimization firm that promised to elevate its clients’ 
rankings in a Google search. When Google caught wind of the 
business, the search engine actively demoted Search King’s 
clients. Search King sued Google for tortious interference 
with contract.92 Google raised a First Amendment defense and 
the court agreed, refusing to grant Search King a preliminary 
injunction. Google argued that although it uses sophisticated 
computerized algorithms, those algorithms “inherently 
incorporate the search engine company engineers’ judgments 
about what material users are likely to find responsive to these 
queries.”93
To fortify their stance on the matter, in 2012, Google 
commissioned a white paper by prominent UCLA law professor 
Eugene Volokh and class action attorney Donald Falk in 
which the pair asserted that Google is akin to a modern day 
newspaper editor.94 Just as a newspaper editor selects the 
most important stories of the day and presents them on the 
front page, Google’s engineers code an algorithm with various 
criteria and direction on how to rank and present the world’s 
web pages and hence, according to Volokh and Falk, are entitled 
to the same protections.95 At least two courts have agreed with 
the newspaper editor analogy, finding that a search engine’s 
engineers have editorial “autonomy to choose the content of 
[their] own message.”96
These opinions have prompted a vast amount of 
scholarship debating whether algorithmic outputs should 
be considered speech.97 Many have questioned whether a 
message is actually communicated through such subtleties as 
rankings.98 Furthermore, as technology evolves and platforms 
are “entitled to full constitutional protection.”). 
91 Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 
21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Eugene Volokh & Donald Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search 
Engine Search Results, 6-7 (2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf (arguing 
that the First Amendment protects Google’s search results).
95 Id. 
96 Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); See also 
Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007).
97 See e.g., Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 u. Pa. l. rev. 1495 (2013); 
James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 Minn. l. rev. 868 (2014); Stuart 
Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 u. Pa. l. rev. 1445, 1451 (2013). 
98 See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and 
Communicating: Determining What “Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 
60 Duke l. J. 1673, 1689–91 (2011) (arguing that mere transmission is not 
incorporate machine learning algorithms — programs that 
evolve and re-write themselves as a result of being exposed to 
ever-increasing sets of data — it may be even more questionable 
whether content recommendations and rankings reflect 
editorial discretion on behalf of the companies’ engineers.99 
However, as this area of law develops, it seems likely that 
government-imposed limits on platforms’ algorithmic processes 
will conflict with platforms’ rights of editorial discretion, just as 
proposals requiring platforms to publish, keep up, or take down 
content do. 
IV. Conclusion
As this article outlines, proposals intent on regulating 
platforms’ content moderation practices come in many forms: 
requiring platforms to host content and users; modifying Section 
230 immunity; and limiting how platforms recommend and 
rank content. Examining the debate over online speech and 
discourse through a First Amendment lens illustrates that we 
must be careful not to replace platform power with government 
censorship. Regulations concerning private companies’ editorial 
discretion over what content to host and how to deliver that 
content bring with them a dangerous potential to restrict 
the public’s access to information — either intentionally or 
unintentionally through vague and overbroad requirements. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that government intrusion upon 
private editorial discretion is warranted here. Platforms, 
operating at the application layer, do not possess physical 
infrastructural control over access to the internet. New 
platforms can and do emerge to reflect different viewpoints 
and consumer choices as the rise of Parler and OnlyFans 
highlights. Rather, overly burdensome requirements such as 
detailed transparency reports or short take-down timeframes 
will be likely to more firmly entrench those platforms with 
the resources to comply. Such regulations would serve to 
concentrate platform power — not to dispel it. The most 
important consideration should not be that platforms be 
politically neutral or represent all viewpoints, but that the public 
remain free to choose among alternative sources of information 
that emerge.
speech). See also supra note 45.
99 These modern algorithms are no longer fixed in form but are emergent 
and constantly unfolding and updating in multifarious ways, thus making it 
difficult for engineers to identify exactly how they come to decisions. Will 






Regulation, continued from page 21
Congratulations, Scott!
Dr. Scott Memmel received the 2021 Nafziger-White-Salwen Dissertation Award for his dissertation titled 
“Pressing the Police and Policing the Press: The History and Law of the Relationship Between the News Media 
and Law Enforcement in the United States,” which was written during his time at the Hubbard School of 
Journalism and Mass Communication (HSJMC) under the direction of his advisor, Professor Jane E. Kirtley, 
Director of the Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and Law.
The Nafziger-White-Salwen Dissertation Award is the highest honor bestowed by the Association for Education 
in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC) for student scholarship, recognizing the best dissertation in 
the field of mass communication research.
Dr. Memmel is a Postdoctoral Associate at HSJMC and a former Silha Bulletin Editor.
23
Challenging Government Secrecy: An Analysis of 
Minnesota Government Data Practices Act Cases 
in Administrative Court
W
hat happens when public records requesters 
are denied access to government information? 
In Minnesota, requesters seeking records under 
the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act 
(MGDPA) have several options.1 Requesters 
can try to negotiate informally with the agency denying access 
to the records. Requesters can ask the state’s Data Practices 
Office, a unit of the Minnesota Department of Administration, 
for non-binding guidance, which the Office has discretion to 
provide.2 Or requesters can litigate. Although requesters can 
file suit in county district courts,3 they can also seek expedited 
review of an agency’s response by filing a complaint with 
the state’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), a state 
administrative court.4
This article examines how OAH handles public records 
complaints and analyzes the office’s recent caseload. The 
research finds 16 MGDPA cases between 2012 and early 
2020 in which requesters sought intervention from OAH to 
compel access to public records. Eight of the complaints 
were dismissed, three cases resulted in an order to disclose, 
another three cases were withdrawn, and at least two cases 
were settled. Slightly more than half of the complainants were 
represented by legal counsel; two of the complainants were 
lawyers themselves.
The article also examines these cases in the broader context 
of administrative review mechanisms, which are processes 
to resolve disclosure disputes outside the path of normal 
litigation. In so doing, the article analyzes how OAH works and 
how effective it is at resolving disputes that arise under the 
MGDPA. The analysis makes several notable findings: (1) OAH 
is a potentially powerful mechanism for requesters to obtain 
third-party review of disclosure disputes in a way that is faster 
and less expensive than suing in district court; (2) OAH has 
been used by a wide range of complainants across Minnesota; 
but (3) relatively few requesters use OAH to resolve disclosure 
disputes. This article suggests that reducing the appeal filing 
fee may enable more people to use OAH to resolve disclosure 
disputes.
The Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
The Minnesota Legislature added the OAH review provision 
to the MGDPA in 2010.5 The law created an expedited process to 
adjudicate complaints that government agencies were violating 
the MGDPA, and gave OAH binding authority to compel 
compliance.
The statute lays out the basic procedure for how the system 
is supposed to work. An aggrieved record requester must first 
file a complaint with OAH and pay a $1,000 filing fee, although 
the fee is largely refunded if the complaint is upheld.6 The 
complaint generally must be filed within two years after the 
government agency’s action or inaction that is the subject of 
1 Minn. Stat. § 13.01 et seq..
2 Id. § 13.072.
3 Id. § 13.08.
4 Id. § 13.085.
5 Chapter 297—H.F.No. 2899, Minnesota Session Laws, Regular Session, 
Office of the Revisor of Statutes (2010).
6 Minn. Stat. § 13.085, subd. 6(c).
the complaint.7 OAH must then give notice of the complaint 
to several specified people and offices. First, OAH must notify 
the official or government authority that is the subject of 
the complaint, typically referred to as the respondent.8 The 
respondent generally has up to 15 business days after receiving 
notice of the complaint to submit a response.9 Second, OAH 
must notify, “to the extent practicable,” any persons or entities 
that are the subjects of any of the records.10 Third, OAH must 
give notice to the Minnesota Commissioner of Administration 
that a complaint has been filed seeking access to records under 
the MGDPA.11 State law requires OAH to dismiss the complaint 
and refund the filing fee if the Commissioner had accepted a 
request for an opinion on the same matter before the complaint 
was filed with OAH. If the Commissioner decides not to issue 
an opinion on the substance of the matter, that determination 
must be provided to the requester within five business days of 
receipt of the request. Otherwise, the Commissioner is required 
to issue an opinion within 20 business days of receiving the 
request, although the Commissioner may extend the deadline 
by up to 30 additional days.
Assuming the complaint is not the subject of a pending 
opinion request with the Commissioner of Administration, the 
complaint can then proceed at OAH, where an administrative 
law judge is required to issue a preliminary determination about 
the disposition of the complaint within 20 business days after 
the respondent files a response or after the respondent’s time 
to file a response has expired.12 The preliminary determination 
is binary and must be one of two possibilities. Relying on 
information from the complaint and the agency’s response, the 
judge can find either that there is probable cause to believe 
that the MGDPA was violated, at which point the judge must 
schedule a hearing, or the judge must find that the facts do not 
establish probable cause that the MGDPA was violated, which 
would prompt dismissal of the complaint.13 If dismissal occurs, 
the complainant is entitled to ask the Chief Administrative Law 
Judge to reconsider the dismissal on the grounds that there was 
a clear material error.14
When a judge finds probable cause to believe that the 
MGDPA was violated, OAH must notify all parties and inform 
them that they can “submit evidence, affidavits, documentation, 
and argument for consideration”;15 a hearing must be scheduled 
within 30 business days after the parties are notified of the 
probable cause determination, although the parties may waive 
the hearing when its purpose is to resolve questions of law.16 
The judge is then required to issue a decision within 10 business 
days of closing the hearing record. The judge is required to 
make a determination about whether the alleged violation 
occurred and take at least one of five actions: (1) dismiss the 
complaint; (2) find that the respondent violated the MGDPA; 
7 Id. § 13.085, subd. 2(b).
8 Id. § 13.085, subd. 2(d).
9 Id. § 13.085, subd. 2(f).
10 Id. § 13.085, subd. 2(d).
11 Id. § 13.085, subd. 2(e).
12 Id. § 13.085, subd. 3(a).
13 Id. § 13.085, subd. 3(a)(1)-(2).
14 Id. § 13.085, subd. 3(c).
15 Id. § 13.085, subd. 3(b)(1).
16 Id. § 13.085, subd. 4(a).
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(3) fine the respondent up to $300; (4) order the respondent 
to comply with the MGDPA; and/or (5) refer the complaint 
for prosecution for potential criminal charges.17 Parties are 
entitled to judicial review of OAH decisions to the state Court 
of Appeals and potentially to the state Supreme Court, if the 
justices accept review at that level.18 Parties are also entitled 
to bring a subsequent action that alleges the same violations in 
district court, although OAH decisions are not binding on the 
district court.19 
Complainants who prevail on the merits in substantial part 
are entitled to a “rebuttable presumption” that reasonable 
attorney’s fees will be paid up to $5,000, except in cases when 
the violation is purely technical or when the law’s meaning 
is reasonably ambiguous.20 The law provides that attorney’s 
fees must be awarded up to $5,000 if the respondent authority 
had been the subject of a written opinion by the Minnesota 
Commissioner of Administration that was directly about the 
dispute and the authority “did not act in conformity with the 
opinion.”21 If the judge finds that the complaint was frivolous or 
used to harass, the judge must order the complainant to pay the 
respondent’s attorney’s fees up to $5,000.22
Administrative review mechanisms like the OAH complaint 
procedure are processes aimed, at least in part, at resolving 
public records disputes outside of typical litigation. Four 
types of administrative review mechanisms exist in the United 
States. First, mediation-oriented mechanisms seek to resolve 
disclosure disputes through voluntary cooperation among the 
parties, usually facilitated by a neutral third party, such as a 
mediator or ombudsperson.23 Second, adjudication-oriented 
mechanisms seek to resolve disclosure disputes using 
formal, quasi-judicial processes. Whereas mediation-oriented 
mechanisms aim for mutual satisfaction between the disputing 
parties, adjudication-oriented mechanisms are more focused on 
identifying who is right.24 Third, advisory-oriented mechanisms 
typically involve a third party who reviews a dispute and issues 
a non-binding, advisory opinion. Fourth, litigation surrogate 
mechanisms authorize a third party, such as a state attorney 
general, to sue a government agency in court on behalf of a 
record requester.
OAH fits the closest to adjudication-oriented mechanisms. 
OAH uses a formal, adversarial, and quasi-judicial process 
to resolve public records disputes, but does so in a manner 
that may be faster and less expensive than litigation in a state 
district court.
Analysis of Minnesota Government Data Practices Act 
Complaints
This section summarizes the nature and disposition of 
MGDPA complaints filed with OAH between 2012 and early 
2020 in which requesters were seeking access to records. 
Complaints were identified by filing a MGDPA request with 
OAH in 2020 for copies of the complaints and related case 
17 Id. § 13.085, subd. 5(a).
18 Id. § 13.085, subd. 5(d).
19 Id. § 13.085, subd. 5(e).
20 Id. § 13.085, subd. 6(a).
21 Id. § 13.085, subd. 6(b).
22 Id. § 13.085, subd. 6(e).
23 William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett, & Stephen B. Goldberg, getting DiSPuteS 
reSolveD (1988).
24 Daxton R. Stewart, Constructively Managing Conflict About Open 
Government: Use of Ombuds and Other Dispute Resolution Systems in 
State and Federal Sunshine Laws (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Missouri), at 23-24.
filings. In response to the request, OAH produced copies of 
16 complaints and related case documentation in which the 
complainant sought access to records and which resulted 
in some sort of action by an administrative law judge. Some 
complaints that OAH produced were excluded from analysis 
either because they were not about access or the requester did 
not submit the required filing fee.
Cases in this analysis are categorized by complainant type. 
Four complaints involved requests from the news media, three 
were filed by businesses or individuals engaged in commercial 
activity, eight were filed by individuals in their personal 
capacity, and one complaint was brought by a fraternity.
Journalistic Complainants:
KSTP-TV v. Metro Transit and the Metropolitan Council 
(2013)
In KSTP-TV v. Metro Transit and the Metropolitan 
Council, complainant KSTP-TV requested video from two 
separate, unrelated bus incidents in 2013.25 Metro Transit 
opened investigations into both cases to determine whether 
its drivers were at fault. As part of the investigations, Metro 
Transit reviewed camera footage from the buses. Neither driver 
was ultimately disciplined. A KSTP-TV reporter requested the 
camera footage from these investigations, but Metro Transit 
asserted that the videos constituted personnel information and 
therefore were private, not public, data. The television station, 
represented by counsel, later filed an expedited data practices 
complaint with OAH.
Administrative Law Judge Eric L. Lipman held a hearing 
to determine whether probable cause existed as to whether 
Metro Transit violated the MGDPA. Metro Transit argued that 
the videos were private personnel information, and that the 
segments of the video that were public could not be separated 
from the private portions. This consistently had been Metro 
Transit’s position concerning videos reviewed for employee 
investigations. Lipman noted that in a similar but unrelated 
records dispute, a district court had recently ordered the 
Metropolitan Council to turn over security footage from a bus 
incident,26 and he cited this case in disagreeing with Metro 
Transit’s analysis.
Lipman observed that under MGDPA, data created or 
collected for the purpose of investigating employee misconduct 
is private personnel data until there is disciplinary action 
against the employee. However, he found that the exemption 
did not apply in this case because the video footage was not 
created for the purpose of investigating the drivers. Lipman 
further found that there was no risk of biased or fabricated 
information, as in previous cases, so employees who were 
recorded by the security cameras in this case would not be 
harmed by false rumors or statements. The cameras were also 
in public spaces freely accessible to everyone. Several previous 
advisory opinions from the Commissioner of Administration 
held that cameras in public spaces did not become nonpublic 
simply because an employee was present. Finally, because 
Metro Transit had admitted that any video footage it had not 
reviewed was public, Lipman wrote that it was nonsensical to 
believe such footage became private simply because an official 
reviewed it as part of an investigation.
Lipman concluded that there was probable cause that a 
violation of the MGDPA had occurred. He further noted that 
25 In re KSTP-TV v. Metro Transit and the Metropolitan Council, No. 
8-0305-31782 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
26 Memorandum and Order, Burks v. Metropolitan Council, 27-CV-14-3175 
(Dist. Ct. Minn. Sept. 17, 2014) (unpublished).
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because there were no facts in dispute, an evidentiary hearing 
would be unnecessary. Although the parties had a right to 
proceed to a hearing, they agreed that interpretation of the law 
was the only issue. Lipman later entered an order compelling 
Metro Transit to produce the videos. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Lipman’s order,27 
but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the 
case back to OAH for further proceedings  to assess “whether 
the recording . . . was ‘maintained’ by Metro Transit exclusively 
for a personnel purpose at the time KSTP made its request to 
access the data.”28 Metro Transit later provided the requested 
video to KSTP, and Lipman subsequently dismissed the case.
Gilbert v. Minnesota Dep't of Human Services (2019)
In Gilbert v. Minnesota Dep't of Human Services, 
Curtis Gilbert of American Public Media requested a county 
breakdown of minors sent out of state by the Minnesota 
Department of Human Services (DHS) for residential 
treatment.29 Gilbert requested summary data collected by 
DHS under the Interstate Compact of Placement of Children, 
including the dates of placement, the receiving agency, the 
facility of placement, and the county that made the placement.
Gilbert received a partial response to his request. DHS sent 
him a spreadsheet containing all the requested data except 
for the number of placements from each county. Gilbert then 
requested the missing data. DHS responded that it would not 
provide that information, which was categorized as private 
under Minn. Stat. § 13.46 because it could be used to identify 
a juvenile. When Gilbert asked how such information could 
identify a juvenile, he was informed that some counties 
had populations so small that disclosing the numbers could 
inadvertently identify the minors.
Gilbert responded that because every county in Minnesota 
had at least 500 minors, he would be unable to identify the ones 
placed out of state. He noted that OAH had previously held that 
demographic data was not “identifying” provided that the group 
to which the data applied had at least ten members. Because 
he sought data for a much larger set of people, the data should 
be provided to him. He further noted that prior decisions 
holding that there was a reasonable likelihood of identification 
relied on combining the requested data with other public data. 
In this case, Gilbert argued, there was no other public data 
available that could lead to identification. The parties eventually 
settled and the complaint was dismissed. Gilbert pursued the 
complaint without an attorney.
Webster v. Hennepin Cnty. and Hennepin Cnty. Sheriff’s 
Office (2016)
In Webster v. Hennepin Cnty. and Hennepin Cnty. Sheriff’s 
Office, independent journalist Tony Webster requested records 
about biometric data, including emails, from the Hennepin 
County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO).30 He followed up several times 
to check on the status of his request over the course of three 
months. Webster received six email responses to his inquiries, 
all stating that his request was still being processed, but HCSO 
refused to share details about what the office was doing to 
comply with the request or whether there were any problems 
producing the requested records.
27 KSTP v. Metro Transit, 868 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015).
28 KSTP v. Metropolitan Council, 884 N.W.2d 342, 350 (Minn. 2016).
29 In re Curtis Gilbert v. Minnesota Dep’t of Human Services, No. 80-0305-
364012 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
30 In re Tony Webster v. Hennepin Cnty. and Hennepin Cnty. Sheriff’s 
Office, No. 5-0305-33135 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
HCSO later provided Webster with records responsive to his 
request except for the emails. He was informed that searching 
for the 10 keyword terms he sought was too burdensome, as the 
office had run a test search that took seven hours and produced 
312 emails. Webster, represented by counsel, then filed a 
complaint with OAH.
At an evidentiary hearing, it was revealed that the initial 
email search had not been done in the fastest way or limited by 
date. It was also revealed that two additional email searches 
had been performed, but the results had not been provided to 
Webster. HCSO estimated that doing a multi-inbox search for 
the request would take 18 hours.
Administrative Law Judge Jim Mortenson found several 
violations of the MGDPA. He found first that HCSO did not 
respond to Webster’s request in a timely fashion. Further, it had 
failed to maintain its email communications in a manner that 
made searching and accessing public data “easily accessible 
for convenient use.” He also found that Webster had not been 
permitted to inspect all documents responsive to his request 
and was not informed of the legal basis for withholding any 
data.
Mortenson ordered HCSO to provide Webster with the 
opportunity to inspect all responsive data. He further ordered 
HCSO to perform the email search and preserve the metadata.  
However, given the volume of emails, they could be provided 
on a rolling weekly basis to Webster. Mortenson imposed 
a civil fine of $300 and ordered HCSO to better organize its 
public data so that it would be easily accessible to the public. 
The dispute was later appealed to the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals31 and the Minnesota Supreme Court.32 The Supreme 
Court found that HCSO failed to allow Webster to inspect 
and copy the requested data, failed to establish procedures 
ensuring that MGDPA requests are “received and complied with 
in an appropriate and prompt manner,” and failed to inform 
Webster in a timely manner of the legal citation supporting the 
office’s determination to deny access. However, the Supreme 
Court reversed the finding that HCSO had failed to maintain 
government data so they are “easily accessible for convenient 
use.” 
The case then returned to OAH, and Mortenson ordered 
HCSO to provide Webster an opportunity to inspect data he had 
requested, but had not been given access to, including emails 
with metadata. Mortenson also ordered HCSO to pay the $300 
civil penalty, as well as $1,000 in hearing costs to OAH.
Helmberger v. Johnson Controls (2012)
Marshall Helmberger, the publisher and managing editor 
of The Timberjay newspaper in northern Minnesota, filed 
a MGDPA request for a copy of a subcontract between 
Johnson Controls and one of its subcontractors, Architectural 
Resources, Inc. (ARI).33 The subcontract was for a project 
Johnson Controls was managing for a local public school 
district. The school district responded to Helmberger’s 
request by stating that although it had a copy of its contract 
with Johnson Controls, the district did not have a copy of the 
subcontract between Johnson Controls and ARI. Helmberger 
then requested the subcontract directly from Johnson 
31 Webster v. Hennepin Cty., No. A16-0736, 2017 WL 1316109 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 10, 2017).
32 Webster v. Hennepin Cty., 910 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 2018).
33 In re Marshall Helmberger v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 8-0305-22159-
DP (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
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Controls, which refused to produce the records. Helmberger 
subsequently filed a complaint with OAH and had the assistance 
of counsel at some, but not all, times during the proceedings.
OAH dismissed the complaint, finding that Helmberger did 
not present sufficient facts to establish probable cause that the 
MGDPA was violated. Helmberger sought reconsideration of 
the dismissal, arguing that Johnson Controls was performing 
a governmental function. The Chief Administrative Law Judge 
granted the reconsideration petition.
According to OAH, the central legal question presented 
in the case was whether Johnson Controls was performing 
a governmental function under its contract with the school 
district. If so, the company would be subject to the MGDPA 
under the privatization provision of Minn. Stat. § 13.05, subd. 
11(a). That statute states, in relevant part: “If a government 
entity enters into a contract with a private person to perform 
any of its functions, all of the data created, collected, received, 
stored, used, maintained, or disseminated by the private person 
in performing those functions is subject to the requirements 
of this chapter and the private person must comply with those 
requirements as if it were a government entity.”
After an evidentiary hearing, Administrative Law Judge Eric 
L. Lipman dismissed the complaint, concluding that Helmberger 
did not show that architectural services “are traditionally 
performed by school districts in Minnesota.” Lipman also 
concluded that Helmberger failed to show that such services 
are a governmental function of the school district under Minn. 
Stat. § 13.05, subd. 11(a), or that the contract between the 
district and Johnson Controls required the company to publicly 
disclose copies of subcontracts. “[N]ot every disbursement of 
public money includes, or implies, a transfer of powers and 
duties conferred by statute to a private contractor,” Lipman 
wrote.
In interpreting Minn. Stat. § 13.05, subd. 11(a), Lipman 
reached a different conclusion than the state Commissioner 
of Administration, who had opined in an earlier advisory 
opinion that a contractor responsible for the construction and 
renovation of a public school was performing a governmental 
function. Lipman wrote that there was reason to depart from 
the non-binding advisory opinion because it did not reference 
legislative history that suggested the privatization provision of 
the MGDPA should be read and applied broadly. “Because the 
requested subcontractor data is not held by the School District, 
and the District has not transferred government functions to 
Johnson Controls, Mr. Helmberger is not entitled to relief under 
the Data Practices Act,” Lipman wrote. Helmberger appealed, 
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed OAH, finding that 
Johnson Controls was contracted to perform a government 
function.34 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals, concluding that Johnson Controls was not 
required to perform a governmental function under its contract 
with the school district, and that even if it was, MGDPA does 
not require that data maintained by a government contractor is 
subject to disclosure.35
Commercial Complainants:
Halva v. Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (2017)
This case stemmed from a request for proposals (RFP) that 
34 Marshall Helmberger v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 821 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2012).
35 Marshall Helmberger v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 839 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 
2013).
Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (Minnesota State) 
issued for an online course registration system.36 Tyler Halva, 
a computer engineer, submitted a response to this RFP. A 
university selection committee later evaluated the proposals 
during a remote video meeting and used Adobe Acrobat to 
highlight the proposals electronically, but the highlights were 
not saved. In December 2015, after Halva learned that his 
proposal was not selected, he filed a data request for the names 
of the bidders. Six weeks later, Halva received the names of 
three other bidders who were not awarded the contract. In 
February 2016, Halva sought the proposal documents and 
evaluation materials of all bidders and went on to file additional 
data requests for records from Minnesota State related to the 
RFP. Minnesota State did not acknowledge that it had received 
Halva’s requests until August 2016. Minnesota State later sent 
Halva a flash drive with the requested data of the three other 
bidders. However, Halva did not receive a copy of the RFP 
materials he had submitted or evaluative records related to his 
submission.
On his own behalf and without counsel,37 Halva filed an 
expedited MGDPA complaint asking to be provided with his 
proposal and any evaluation materials related to it. He also 
alleged that Minnesota State’s responses to him were not timely. 
Minnesota State countered that it did not think it had to provide 
Halva with a copy of his own proposal, and that his proposal 
was rejected for being incomplete.
Administrative Law Judge Laurasue Schlatter found that 
Minnesota State violated the MGDPA, concluding that there 
was no reason for the university to have taken so long to reply 
to Halva’s requests, and that the university should at least have 
acknowledged receipt of the requests earlier. She also found no 
support that the university was not required to provide Halva 
with his own proposal. In fact, Halva specifically asked for all 
proposals, which would have included his. Minnesota State also 
sent no evaluation materials related to his proposal and did not 
tell him why.
As a result, Schlatter ordered Minnesota State to provide 
Halva with a copy of his proposal and to determine whether 
the university had retained a copy of the evaluation materials 
for it, namely the highlighted portions. Minnesota State later 
acknowledged that it did not retain the highlights. Halva then 
argued that Minnesota State was obligated to use software that 
would preserve highlighting and that the video meeting should 
have been recorded. However, Halva made those arguments 
citing the state’s Official Records Act,38 which governs record 
retention, and not the MGDPA. Minnesota State argued, and 
Schlatter agreed, that Halva’s claims under the Official Records 
Act were outside the jurisdiction of OAH. Although OAH is 
statutorily authorized to adjudicate MGDPA complaints, it 
is not authorized to adjudicate complaints arising under the 
Official Records Act. Schlatter wrote that under the MGDPA, 
the university was not required to “provide data that was not 
recorded in physical form outside the minds of the staff who 
discussed his proposal.” Moreover, Schlatter wrote that the 
university does not have a duty to “acquire a particular kind of 
software in order to create a permanent record of an electronic 
conversation or meeting.”
36 In re Tyler Halva v. Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, No. 80-
0305-33827 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
37 Halva was not formally represented in the proceedings, but he disclosed 
that he had sought legal advice from a law firm prior to filing the complaint.
38 Minn. Stat. § 15.17, subd. 1.
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Halva subsequently filed a lawsuit in district court.39 As part 
of the suit, he sought to compel Minnesota State to comply 
with the MGDA and the Official Records Act. He also sought 
damages for Schlatter’s finding that Minnesota State violated 
Minn. Stat. § 13.03 when it failed to respond “in a reasonable, 
prompt, and appropriate manner.” The district court “concluded 
that because Halva commenced his MGDPA action in the 
OAH, he could not relitigate the MGDPA matters in district 
court.” The Court of Appeals reversed, however, writing that 
Halva “could file a complaint in the OAH seeking to compel 
[Minnesota State’s] compliance with the MGDPA and then file a 
complaint in district court seeking damages based on the same 
alleged violation.”40 
The Court of Appeals observed that under Minn. Stat. 
§ 13.08, subd. 4, “an action to compel compliance with the 
MGDPA may either be brought in district court or filed in the 
OAH.” Further, under Minn. Stat. § 13.085, subd. 5(e), an OAH 
decision “is not controlling in any subsequent action brought in 
district court alleging the same violation and seeking damages.” 
However, the Court of Appeals also found that there is no 
private cause of action under the Official Records Act to pursue 
claims that it has been violated. Halva appealed the latter issue 
about the Official Records Act to the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
which accepted review.41 The Supreme Court agreed that the 
Official Records Act provides no private cause of action.
Walmart v. Anoka Cnty. (2019)
Legal counsel for Walmart requested data related to a 
continuing legal education course (CLE) run by the Minnesota 
County Attorneys Association (MCAA) entitled “Litigation of 
a Big Box Property Tax Appeal.”42 The CLE was in the form of 
a password-protected webinar. At the time, several counties 
in Minnesota were engaged in property tax disputes with 
Walmart. The request specifically sought a video recording of 
the webinar, communications discussing presentations about 
tax appeals for big box properties, and presentations by two 
Assistant Anoka County Attorneys. Anoka County denied 
Walmart’s request, asserting that the materials were not public 
data and constituted privileged attorney work-product.
Walmart disagreed and its attorneys filed a complaint with 
OAH. The company argued that the records were not protected 
by the attorney work-product privilege because a legal doctrine 
required to apply the privilege, the common interest doctrine, 
had not been formally recognized by Minnesota appellate 
courts. The common interest doctrine, when recognized, allows 
different parties to share sensitive information prepared by or 
for attorneys under representation when those parties share 
a common interest (i.e., ensuring big box stores pay taxes) 
and the parties are not adverse. Walmart further asserted that 
disclosure of the webinar would enable public understanding of 
how prosecutors make decisions. 
Administrative Law Judge Eric L. Lipman issued a subpoena 
duces tecum to MCAA for the names of all people who accessed 
the webinar. He was able to confirm that the attendees were 
limited to current county attorneys and staff.
39 Tyler Halva vs Minnesota State Colleges & Universities, 62-CV-18-3910 
(Dist. Ct. Minn. June 6, 2018).
40 Halva v. Minnesota State Colleges & Universities, 937 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2019).
41 Halva v. Minnesota State Colleges & Universities, 953 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 
2021).
42 In re Walmart Inc. v. Anoka Cnty., No. 8-0305-36242 (Minn. Office Admin. 
Hearings).
Lipman observed that attorney work-product privilege 
applies to mental impressions, trial strategy, and legal 
theories when preparing for litigation. Here, the CLE was 
about strategies in tax appeals. Anoka County argued that the 
privilege was not waived because the webinar was provided 
only to other county attorneys who had a similar interest in 
prevailing in tax appeals. Password-protecting the webinar 
showed that they took steps to prevent access by anyone 
who did not have a common interest. Lipman agreed with this 
argument.
Although Lipman found that Walmart was correct that 
Minnesota had never explicitly adopted the common interest 
doctrine, many Minnesota cases had relied on the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,43 which applied the 
work-product privilege between attorneys with different 
employers. The Restatement extends the common interest 
doctrine to non-attorneys who share a “common interest ” 
with an attorney. Therefore, Walmart’s argument did not stand, 
Lipman concluded.
Finally, Lipman found that disclosure of the seminar would 
not provide a window into public decision-making. Lipman 
distinguished the case from a district court decision cited 
by Walmart in which the court found that guidelines for how 
to resolve minor traffic offenses were not privileged from 
disclosure. In that case, those guidelines were shared widely 
across multiple branches of government, given to adversaries 
in litigation, and were classified public data by statute. Here, 
Lipman wrote that the CLE was not shared with adversaries 
or indeed anyone outside of the MCAA. Therefore, Lipman 
concluded, there was no statutory duty to produce the CLE.
Hurlbert v. Mahnomen County (2014)
Roger W. Hurlbert, president of Sage Information Services, 
requested the real property assessment records for all 
properties in Mahnomen County, Minn.44 He specifically 
requested the records be provided as a database or in an 
electronic format “capable of being sorted and manipulated.” 
Hurlbert was referred to the county auditor’s office, but he 
did not receive a response. On his own behalf and without 
legal counsel, Hurlbert then filed an expedited MGDPA 
complaint with OAH, alleging that he never received a response 
to his request and that the Mahnomen County Assessor’s 
Office refused to provide him with the name of the agency’s 
responsible authority who handles public records requests, as 
required by the MGDPA. Hurlbert later withdrew his complaint 
and the case was dismissed. The order of dismissal did not 
specify why Hurlbert withdrew the complaint.
Individual Complainants:
Beedle v. Minneapolis Public Schools (2013)
John Beedle, through his counsel, Michael Cain, filed a 
MGDPA request with Minneapolis Public Schools (MPS) 
seeking semi-annual reports of the School Attendance Review 
Board (SARB) from 2008 through 2011.45 Cain sent the request 
through emails addressed to Scott Weber, counsel for MPS, 
and a specified data request email address. However, Cain 
43 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 91(4).
44 In re Roger Hurlbert d/b/a Sage Information Services, No. 60-0305-31500 
(Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
45 In re John Beedle v. Minneapolis Public Schools, No. 16-0305-30450 
(Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
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misspelled the data request email address. Weber replied that 
the requested documents did not exist and provided Cain with 
the correct email address. Cain again sent a records request to 
the same email addresses, including one of the erroneous email 
addresses, for the SARB reports and additional documents, 
stating they fell under Minn. Stat. § 13.03. 
After receiving no response to the second request and a 
follow-up inquiry, Beedle filed a complaint with OAH alleging 
that MPS violated the MGDPA by not providing the requested 
documents and that the documents did exist and were under 
the control of MPS.
Upon receiving the complaint, MPS conducted a thorough 
search of its records and located four responsive documents. 
MPS forwarded the documents to Beedle and informed him 
that the other documents either did not exist or were not in the 
control of MPS. MPS further stated that because the requests 
were not sent to the correct email address, they were not 
recognized as data requests.
Administrative Law Judge Manuel J. Cervantes reviewed 
Beedle’s complaint and MPS’ response and ruled that there was 
no probable cause to find a violation of the MGDPA. Cervantes 
found that MPS had provided all relevant documents under its 
control and provided such records in a timely manner.  
Beedle then petitioned OAH for a rehearing. Chief 
Administrative Law Judge Raymond R. Krause denied the 
petition, finding that the record showed that Beedle could 
not sustain the complaint on the facts submitted to OAH and 
that Cervantes did not commit a clear material error. The 
data requests had been incorrectly submitted, and once MPS 
received notice of the complaint, it promptly and thoroughly 
responded to the request. Furthermore, although Beedle alleged 
that MPS did not provide him with all documents he requested, 
he failed to provide sufficient facts to show that the documents 
in fact existed, or if they did, that they were currently under 
the control of MPS. As a result, Krause denied the petition for 
reconsideration.
Gibson v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Attorney (2013)
Shane Gibson cut down trees and bushes on his property 
in Spicer, Minn. and areas adjacent to his property within a 
right-of-way held by the Lake Andrew Township.46 As a result, 
Gibson was charged with a felony count of criminal damage to 
property. The county later dismissed the charges against him 
because there was a dispute as to ownership of the easement.
Gibson subsequently requested information related to 
the prosecution, including communications between the 
prosecutor’s office and various other parties. The Kandiyohi 
County Attorney’s Office responded that all responsive 
documents had been provided during the discovery process 
for the dismissed case, and the remaining documents were 
governed by attorney work-product privilege.
After counsel for Gibson filed a complaint with OAH, 
Administrative Law Judge Eric L. Lipman determined that 
he would need to do an in camera review of the disputed 
materials to assess whether the County Attorney had invoked 
the work-product privilege properly. The privilege applies 
to documents and other materials “prepared in anticipation 
of litigation.” After reviewing the disputed items, Lipman 
determined that they were all materials prepared in preparation 
for trial and were privileged. The records included “trial 
46 In re Shane Gibson v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Attorney, No. 8-0305-30695 (Minn. 
Office Admin. Hearings).
preparation documents that contain the fruits of the attorney’s 
investigative endeavors,” “relevant evidence prepared by the 
attorney,” and “mental impressions, opinions and legal theories” 
that government attorneys had prepared. Lipman subsequently 
dismissed the complaint.
Tallman v. City of Rockville (2015)
Complainant Richard Tallman believed that the city of 
Rockville, Minn. was overcharging its residents for water 
and sewer services.47 Over the course of several years, the 
relationship between Tallman and Rockville became strained 
because of his numerous complex data requests.
Tallman requested a spreadsheet of the sales tax charged  
for water services in the second quarter of 2011, which the 
city provided. After reviewing the data, Tallman had questions 
as to how the sales tax amount was calculated. The city did 
not consider his question a data request because it sought 
the mental impression of employees, and the city declined to 
answer his question.
On his own behalf and without legal counsel, Tallman filed 
an expedited complaint with OAH, arguing that Rockville was 
attempting to chill his access to public records. He contended 
that the city had not answered his sales tax question, had billed 
him excessively for records, and had a form with incorrect 
rates on it  for processing MGDPA requests. Tallman also 
alleged that the city did not comply with a provision of the 
MGDPA requiring authorities to make available their written  
data access policies. Minn. Stat. § 13.025, subd. 4 requires a 
responsible authority to make copies of policies about data 
access and requesters’ rights to data “available to the public 
by distributing free copies to the public or by posting the 
policies in a conspicuous place within the government entity 
that is easily accessible to the public or by posting it on the 
government entity’s website.” 
The city moved to dismiss the complaint, which Lipman 
granted. Although Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 3 (a) requires a 
responsible authority and designee to inform a requester of the 
data’s meaning, Lipman found that Tallman already was aware 
of the data’s meaning — that it was the amount of sales tax 
charged — so the city was not required answer his question.
Lipman agreed with the city that because the fees were 
waived, the overcharging contention was moot. He also found 
that, beyond Tallman’s bare assertion, there was no evidence 
that the City of Rockville did not keep a written policy for 
handling data requests.
Tallman moved for rehearing on the issues of billing and 
alleged failure to make a “‘written data access policy’ available 
to the public.” He stated that he did not believe the case was 
moot because he was “‘grossly aggrieved’ by the city’s conduct.”
Chief Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Pust denied the 
rehearing petition. She noted that Lipman, the administrative 
law judge who initially presided over the complaint, was 
correct that the issue of billing was moot. Because the fees had 
been waived and the city’s MGDPA policy changed, there was 
no controversy for him to decide. She further held that Tallman 
was incorrect when he said Lipman had determined the failure 
to provide written policy was moot. In fact, he had said there 
was no evidence to support Tallman’s claim. Pust thus found no 
clear material error and denied the petition.
Harper v. Minnesota Dep’t of Human Rights (2016)
Nicolas Harper requested documents from the Minnesota 
47 In re Richard D. Tallman v. City of Rockville, No. 8-0305-31990 (Minn. 
Office Admin. Hearings).
28
MGDPA, continued from page 27
Department of Human Rights (MDHR) related to Black Lives 
Matter protests in the Minneapolis Police Department’s Fourth 
Precinct in 2015.48 The request sought a wide range of data, 
including emails, other written communications, or other 
documents that referenced certain topics, keywords, or were 
sent to or received from certain individuals. MDHR informed 
Harper that because of the breadth of his request, the agency 
could not provide a timeframe for when any responsive 
documents would be ready for release. Harper then agreed to 
narrow his request.
Forty-nine days after MDHR confirmed receipt of the 
request, Harper followed up on the status and offered to further 
narrow his request. MDHR told him that was not necessary and 
that the documents were ready for internal, pre-release review. 
Approximately a month later, Harper followed up again and 
sent a letter demanding a prompt response to his request. He 
was advised that the documents would be ready within two 
weeks. 
When Harper followed up again after two more weeks, he 
was advised that the documents were still not ready. Harper 
then requested MDHR provide him with the name of the 
designated responsible authority who would determine what 
records could be released, and a copy of the department 
data request policy. The agency never provided Harper with 
the name of the responsible authority and instead of its 
internal data request policy, sent him a one-page price sheet 
for processing requests. Harper, who is a licensed attorney, 
subsequently filed an expedited complaint with OAH on his 
own behalf.
The complaint alleged that MDHR did not respond to his 
request in a timely fashion, refused to provide the requested 
data in original electronic format, did not inform him of the 
responsible authority, and either did not have or failed to 
update its written data access policy. MDHR moved to dismiss 
the complaint.
Harper later withdrew the portion of the complaint regarding 
production of the requested data in electronic format, which 
Administrative Law Judge Ann C. O’Reilly dismissed. But 
O’Reilly did find probable cause to believe that MDHR violated 
the MGDPA as to Harper’s other claims. O’Reilly found that 133 
days to respond to Harper’s request was enough to establish 
sufficient facts to believe a violation occurred. She further 
found that because the request was transferred among several 
employees and MDHR did not provide Harper with the name 
of the responsible authority, there was probable cause to 
believe that MDHR did not have adequate policies in place for 
dealing with data requests. Although O’Reilly found that MDHR 
actually did have a written data request policy, she also found 
probable cause that it had not been updated as required by law 
and that it was not easily accessible by the public. She finally 
found that although MDHR did have a responsible authority and 
designees for data requests, it did not make such individuals 
easily accessible to the public and that its policy referred only 
to the titles of the designees and not their names. The parties 
settled prior to the evidentiary hearing and the complaint was 
dismissed.
D.J., et al. v. Carver Cnty. Health and Human Services (2017)
Bradley and Karol Johnson are caretakers of their disabled 
adult sons.49 The sons were enrolled in Consumer Directed 
48 In re Nicholas Harper v. Minnesota Dep’t of Human Rights, No. 65-0305-
33466 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
49 In re D.J., S.J., Bradley Johnson, and Karol Johnson v. Carver Cnty. 
Health and Human Services, No. 71-0305-34354 (Minn. Office Admin. 
Community Support (CDCS) services through their county. 
After disputes with CDCS, the sons were involuntarily 
terminated from the services. The Johnsons appealed the 
removal, and the sons were reinstated.
To help facilitate their appeal, the Johnsons sought copies 
of the county’s entire case files for their sons. Carver County 
Health and Human Services (CCHHS), the administrator of 
CDCS, provided portions of the files relevant to the appeals 
free of charge, as required by law when the request is made for 
the purpose of such an appeal. If the Johnsons wanted all data 
in the files, the county insisted that the couple would need to 
make a MGDPA request and incur charges for copying.
The Johnsons argued that they were entitled to the entire 
case files free of charge under Minn. Stat. § 256.0451, subd. 2, 
which provides that appellants in human services proceedings 
have the right of access to the entire case file and “a free copy 
of all documents in the case file involved in a fair hearing 
appeal.” However, the couple also argued that the case files 
were not public data, so data requests under MGDPA were 
inappropriate.
A human services judge reviewed the dispute and 
determined that the Johnsons were only entitled to the 
materials relevant to the appeal free of charge, which CCHHS 
had already provided. He upheld CCHHS’ decision to offer the 
rest of the case files under the MGDPA. On their own behalf and 
without legal counsel, the Johnsons then filed a complaint with 
OAH seeking to compel CCHHS to provide the documents free 
of charge. Administrative Law Judge Jessica A. Palmer-Denig 
found probable cause to conduct a hearing.
At the conclusion of the hearing, all parties agreed that 
the sole matter at issue was the interpretation of Minn. Stat. 
§ 256.0451. The statute says appellants in human services 
proceedings are entitled to “a free copy of all documents in the 
case file involved in a fair hearing appeal.” The Johnsons argued 
that the plain language of the statute meant that they should 
receive a free copy of the case files. Palmer-Denig disagreed, 
finding that although the statute allowed them access to and the 
ability to inspect the entire files, it limited the free copies only 
to those materials that are relevant to the appeal. She reasoned 
that canons of construction meant that no phrase was to be 
interpreted as superfluous. Therefore, she wrote, the words 
“involved in a fair hearing appeal” must modify the phrase “free 
copy.” Thus, Palmer-Denig found that the plain language of 
Minn. Stat. § 256.0451 meant that the Johnsons were entitled 
to access the entire file, but that only those portions of the file 
relevant to the appeal must be provided for free.
Hansen v. Indep. School Dist. 625 (2017)
Complainant Brian Hansen shared joint physical and legal 
custody of his son with his ex-wife.50 As part of the custody 
order, Hansen was partially responsible for the cost of 
childcare. His ex-wife enrolled their son in Discovery Club, 
a program operated by St. Paul Public Schools (SPPS) that 
provides childcare before and after school. The payment 
account was under her name, and she was the sole payor.
Hansen requested from the school district the total amount 
of services rendered by Discovery Club for his son in the 2016 
tax year. SPPS refused to provide the requested information, 
stating that the information was classified as private data and 
Hearings).
50 In re Birch Hansen v. Indep. School Dist. No. 625, No. 71-0305-34693 
(Minn. Office Admin. Hearings).
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did not belong to his son but to his ex-wife. Hansen clarified 
that he was not seeking payment details or invoices, only the 
total amount of care rendered. He also asked for a “written 
explanation regarding why his request was characterized as 
a request for private data on another individual under the 
MGDPA.”
SPPS responded that the information was kept under the 
name of the payor and therefore was the data of the parent, 
not the child. The school district stated that it was not legally 
allowed to release the requested data. Hansen then sought an 
advisory opinion from Minnesota’s Information Policy Analysis 
Division, now called the Data Practices Office, which provides 
guidance, training, and education on the MGDPA and state open 
meetings law. Hansen was informed that there was already an 
advisory opinion supporting his position, and after obtaining 
a copy of that opinion, he forwarded it to SPPS. However, the 
district continued to deny Hansen’s request. SPPS’ General 
Counsel asserted that his communication with the school 
district “has become harassing and burdensome” and could be 
criminal. Counsel for Hansen then filed a complaint with OAH.
Administrative Law Judge Jessica A. Palmer-Denig found 
probable cause that SPPS violated the MGDPA, stating that 
Hansen clearly requested information related only to his son 
and not any information about his ex-wife. She further held 
that Discovery Club’s internal classification of its accounts did 
not change the fact that the data belonged to the child. Palmer-
Denig quoted from the earlier IPAD opinion: “The Legislature 
has placed great import on the policy that parents are entitled, 
in most cases, to gain access to data about their children. 
Therefore, a government entity should not be precluded from 
providing data to one parent simply because doing so may 
mean the entity inadvertently or directly releases data about the 
other parent.” The parties later filed a stipulation for dismissal 
and the complaint was dismissed.
Lastovich v. Scandia Valley Twp. (2017)
Complainant Steven Lastovich alleged that Scandia Valley 
Township, which is in Morrison County, Minn., imposed a large, 
unrecorded easement as a retaliatory action against him and 
another property owner.51 Lastovich requested documents 
from the township regarding the right-of-way easements, 
including notices of violations and waivers. Lastovich initially 
directed his request to the town board, but did not receive 
any of the documents. He was then instructed to direct all 
further communications, including data requests, to the 
township’s attorney. During a meeting with the township 
attorney, Lastovich became aware that the attorney was in 
possession of boxes of unrecorded documents, and that the 
town had even more. Lastovich directed a request to the town 
attorney requesting those documents and reiterating his earlier 
request. He mentioned that the documents did not appear to be 
available from the township’s auditor. Lastovich was provided 
with only one document and was not given an opportunity to 
inspect the unrecorded documents at the town hall. He received 
no other response to his request. After filing a complaint on his 
own behalf with OAH, Lastovich, who is a licensed attorney, 
withdrew the complaint and the case was dismissed.
51 In re: Steven Lastovich v. Scandia Valley Twp., No. 19-0305-34908 (Minn. 
Off. Admin. Hearings).
Kane v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res. (2020)
April Kane was an employee of the Minnesota Department 
of Natural Resources (DNR).52 During her employment, DNR 
installed security cameras inside and outside of the building 
and advised employees that recordings from the cameras were 
considered private data.
Kane submitted two data requests for video footage of 
herself for three specific dates. She specified which cameras 
she wished to view and asked DNR to preserve the footage. 
DNR had never received a request for footage of an employee 
before. In fact, it had not determined whether or how the 
footage was covered by MGDPA.
About two months after her initial request, Kane asked to 
view the DNR footage and asked whether a determination on its 
status had been made. DNR did not respond. Shortly thereafter, 
DNR became aware that no one had filled out the form to 
preserve the footage and it had been overwritten. Eventually, 
DNR determined that the footage was nonpublic security data, 
and so informed Kane. The department did not tell her that the 
requested footage no longer existed. On her own behalf and 
without legal counsel, Kane then filed a complaint with OAH.
Administrative Law Judge Jessica A. Palmer-Denig 
subsequently determined that DNR’s classification of the 
security tape as nonpublic security data was correct, so Kane 
was entitled only to footage in which she was a subject. 
However, to be considered a data subject, Kane would need 
to be clearly identifiable in the footage. Previous opinions 
have held that people only in the background of footage are 
not considered “subjects” for purposes the MGDPA. If Kane 
had been in a prominent incident or if the cameras specifically 
captured her, she would have a right to the footage, Palmer-
Denig found. In this case, because Kane was only occasionally 
caught on camera as she walked by, she was not a subject of the 
footage. As such, Palmer-Denig found that DNR did not violate 
the MGDPA.
However, Palmer-Denig also found that Kane’s request 
amounted to a request for personal data. Under Minn. Stat. 
§ 13.04, agencies must fulfill requests for personal data 
immediately or within 10 days of the request. Because DNR’s 
response took months, it violated Minn. Stat. § 13.04. The 
confusion surrounding the request also showed that DNR did 
not have adequate policies to ensure prompt and appropriate 
response to data requests in violation of Minn. Stat. § 13.03, and 
Palmer-Denig fined DNR $100 for its violations.
Fraternity Complainant:
Minn. Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon v. Univ. of 
Minn. (2015)
The Minnesota Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, a 
fraternity at the University of Minnesota (University), filed 
a MGDPA request with the University after a dean made 
statements that the fraternity had a bad reputation in the 
community, particularly with regard to alcohol and sexual 
assaults.53 Counsel for the fraternity requested all documents 
regarding disciplinary actions against all university-affiliated 
fraternities for the past ten years. The fraternity requested that 
the University notify it of any other organization maintaining 
52 In re April Kane v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., No. 71-0305-36387 (Minn. Off. 
Admin. Hearings).
53 In re Minn. Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, on its own behalf 
and in its representative capacity for its members v. Univ. of Minn., No. 11-
0305-32755 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hearings).
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the records requested and that the University also attempt to 
send it anonymized summaries of any nonpublic or private data.
The University responded by providing the fraternity with 
emails and letters, but little else. The fraternity subsequently 
asked that any memoranda or notes from any University staff 
be provided. The fraternity noted that the material received 
did not support the dean’s statement regarding its reputation, 
and asked that the University either supplement the responsive 
records or confirm that there were no other documents. If the 
response to the request was complete, the fraternity requested a 
statement from then-University President Eric Kaler on whether 
he agreed with the dean’s statements about the fraternity’s 
reputation and history with sexual assaults. The University did 
not reply. The fraternity filed an expedited MGDPA complaint 
with OAH, after which the parties settled and the case was 
dismissed.
Analysis
Analysis of the foregoing cases suggests that OAH can be 
a powerful mechanism for requesters to obtain third-party 
review of disclosure disputes. This is evidenced by the system’s 
structure of the caseload. First, the process is much faster than 
typical litigation. Respondents have only up to 15 business 
days to respond, and the administrative law judge must make 
an initial determination within 20 business days of receiving 
the response. If there is probable cause to believe the MGDPA 
was violated, a hearing must be scheduled within 30 days, 
unless the parties waive it, and the judge is required to issue a 
decision within 10 business days of closing the hearing record. 
Second, OAH is relatively accessible to aggrieved requesters. 
Navigating the complaint process does not require hiring an 
attorney or having specialized legal knowledge, although as the 
foregoing review shows, many parties choose to be represented 
by counsel. Adjudicating through OAH is also likely to be 
less expensive than typical litigation. There is a $1,000 filing 
fee, which is not inconsequential, but it is still cheaper than 
hiring a lawyer in regular court. Most of the fee is refunded if 
a complainant prevails. Moreover, OAH has binding authority 
to compel government agencies to comply with the law, and 
orders can be enforced through district court.
This is not to say that OAH is effective only when it rules in 
favor of a requester. What matters is independent, third-party 
review, and dismissing a complaint on the merits provides 
resolution just as much ordering disclosure of a record. As the 
case review demonstrates, administrative law judges frequently 
explain their reasoning for their rulings,  sometimes at length.
Analysis of the cases show that OAH has been used by a 
wide range of complainants, from individuals who were seeking 
records related to personal and property matters, to journalists 
requesting data for reporting, to businesses seeking records 
that would help their commercial interests, including Walmart, 
the largest corporation in the world when measured by 
revenue. That Walmart, which could no doubt afford to litigate 
in traditional court, chose to use the OAH procedure suggests 
that the timeliness of the review may have been an appealing 
feature influencing the company’s decision.
In light of the clear advantages of OAH, it is confounding 
then that the process is used so infrequently. One potential 
explanation for the low usage is the $1,000 filing fee, which 
may be an obstacle for individuals to file complaints. States 
with more robust adjudication-oriented administrative review 
mechanisms, such as the Connecticut Freedom of Information 
Commission and the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records, 
do not have filing fees and review far more appeals than OAH. 
Thus, a smaller filing fee might lead to greater usage of the OAH 
process.
It would also be helpful to get a more complete sense of how 
often record requesters in Minnesota seek third-party review 
of their requests by comparing the findings of this article with 
caseload data from the Data Practices Office, which provides 
advice about the MGDPA. Any person who disagrees with how 
a government entity has responded to a MGDPA request can 
ask the Data Practices Office for a written opinion about the 
dispute. The Office “may give a written opinion regarding the 
person’s rights as a subject of government data or right to have 
access to government data.” Opinions issued by the Office 
are not binding on government entities, but pursuant to state 
statute, such opinions “must be given deference by a court or 
other tribunal in a proceeding involving the data.” The Office 
posts its opinions online at https://mn.gov/admin/data-practices/
opinions/library/.
Importantly, there is no fee to ask for an opinion from the 
Data Practices Office for disputes involving the MGDPA. The 
Office must also act relatively quickly. As previously noted, the 
Office has five business days to notify a requester if no opinion 
will be issued. If the Office decides to issue an opinion, it must 
do so within 20 days and can extend that timeline up to an 
additional 30 days. Thus in terms of cost and time, the Data 
Practices Office may be a more economical option for record 
requesters to obtain third-party review compared to OAH. On 
the other hand, the Data Practices Office has discretionary 
review and its opinions are nonbinding, whereas OAH must 
take the case and its decision are binding on government 
entities.
Conclusion
The expedited appeal mechanism added to the MGDPA 
in 2010 has provided a faster and less-expensive way to 
resolve disclosure disputes outside of traditional litigation. 
Complainants can seek intervention from OAH without a lawyer 
and can have their disputes reviewed by an administrative law 
judge within a matter of weeks. A key component of meaningful 
access to public records is timeliness, and OAH is one 
mechanism to get much faster resolution than filing a lawsuit. 
Moreover, OAH decisions are binding on government entities 
and officials. However, as this study shows, this mechanism has 
been used only 16 times in the past eight years. One reason may 
be the relatively steep $1,000 filing fee to submit a complaint. To 
help the public enforce their access rights, policymakers should 
consider lowering or eliminating the filing fee to make OAH 
intervention more accessible to people who wish to appeal 
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